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INTRODUCTION
The increasing shortage of transplantable organs and tissues has been widely
documented.' According to data released by the United Network for Organ Sharing
(UNOS),2 more than six thousand patients died in the United States during 1999
while awaiting an organ transplant.3 These statistics reveal a disappointing nineteen
percent increase over the total deaths in 1998." Data on tissue donation are not as
readily available. However, the shortage of transplantable tissues has been blamed
for countless deaths.'
Due to the shortage of transplantable organs and tissues, the medical profession
has begun to view alternative donor sources with increasing approval. Cadaveric
donors are no longer the sole source of transplantable organs and tissues; in fact,
the number of living organ donors now rivals the number of cadaveric organ
donors.' There were 5,848 cadaveric organ donors in the United States in 1999,
1. See Charles T. Carlstrom & Christy D. Rollow, Organ Transplant Shortages: A Matter Of
Life And Death, USA Today, Nov. 1999, at 50 ("The growing shortage of transplantable organs has
reached crisis proportions and is getting worse."); Joyce Howard Price, A Dearth Of Donor Organs,
Insight On The News, June 28, 1999, at 41; TransWeb's website, (visited June 6, 2000)
<http://www.transweb.org> (discussing the shortages in transplantable tissues) (quoting Tom Taddouio,
Director, University of Michigan Skin Bank). In Louisiana, only one out of four patients waiting for
a kidney transplant will receive one because of the shortage of suitable kidney donors. See The National
Kidney Foundation of Louisiana's website, (visited June 9, 2000) <httpJ/www.gnofn.org/-kidneyla/>.
2. The United Network for Organ Sharing [hereinafter UNOSI is a private, nonprofit,
membership corporation qualified as a charitable organization under section 501(cX3) of the Internal
Revenue Code. UNOS administers the national Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network
(OPTN) and the U.S. Scientific Registry on Organ Transplantation under contracts with the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services. The U.S. Scientific Registry is the most complete medical
database in the world, tracking all solid organ transplants since Oct. 1, 1987. See UNOS's website,
(visited June 6, 2000) <http://www.unos.org>.
3. See UNOS's website, supra note 2. The actual number of patients who died awaiting an
organ transplant in 1999 was 6,012 compared to 5,034 in 1998. Patients waiting for an organ transplant
increased by twelve percent in 1999. There were 67,755 patients on the waiting list at the end of 1999
compared to 60,656 at the end of 1998. The waiting list has continued to grow in 2000 and as of April
18, 2000, stood at 68,905. Id.
4. Id.
5. See Mark F. Anderson, Encouraging Bone Marrow Transplants From Unrelated Donors:
Some Proposed Solutions To A Pressuring Social Problem, 54 U. Pitt. L Rev. 477, 479 (1992)
(discussing bone nmrrow donation and stating "despite the existence of millions of potential donors,
many lifesaving transplants are never performed"); see TransWeb's website, supra note 1.
6. A donation by a "living organ donor" and "living tissue donor" refers to a donation wherein
the donor is "living." A "living organ donor" and "living tissue donor" should be contrasted
respectively from a "cadaveric organ donor" and "cadaveric tissue donor" wherein the donor is
deceased. See Transplant Square's website, (visited June 9, 2000) <http://www.transplantsquare.com>.
"Living organ and tissue donors" are further subdivided into 'living related organ and tissue donors"
and "living unrelated organ and tissue donors." See UC Davis Transplant Center's website, (visited
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only forty-one more than in 1998; however, there were 4,662 living organ donors
in the United States during 1999, nearly a seven percent increase over the 4,361 in
1998.'
Undoubtedly, the increase in living donors has saved lives. But, the medical
and legal professions have voiced concern because currently there is no federal
legislation and limited state legislation regulating who may consent to living organ
or tissue donation or how consent for such donations might be obtained This
concern becomes even more alarming when one considers that the number of
living organs and tissues donated annually by minors has drastically increased since
19959 -herein lies the impetus for this article.'0
June 15, 2000) <http://transplant.ucdmc.ucdavis.edu>. For information concerning the increase in
"living organ donations," see Christine Gorman, Spare A Kidney?, Time, Mar. 13, 2000, at 98;
Associated Press, Donation Of Organs By Live Donors Rises, The Advocate, Mar. 1,2000, at 7A ("The
number of people donating kidneys and, increasingly, sections of their livers, while still alive has more
than doubled over the past decade, as transplant patients facing years on a waiting list look for other
options."); Jeffrey P. Kahn, Giving 'T It Hurts: How Far To Go In Living Organ Donation?, (visited
June 20, 2000) <http://www3.cnn.com> ("With improved surgical techniques, living donation has
become commonplace-the number ofikidneys transplanted from living donors now rivals the numbers
from cadavers."); Tim Bonfield, Living Organ Donations Soar, (visited June 5, 2000)
<http://enq uirer.com> ("With waiting lists getting longer every year for cadaver-donated organs, living
organ donations are soaring in popularity.").
7. See UNOS's website, supra note 2. In fact, in 1999, living liver donation increased by
approximately two hundred percent, rising from 56 donors in 1998 to 173 in 1999. Id.
8. See Joel D. Kallich & Jon F. Merz, The Transplant Imperative: Protecting Living Donors
From The Pressure To Donate, 20 J. Corp. L. 139 (1995) [hereinafter Kallich & Merz] (discussing the
use of living organ donors and stating that many physicians believe that the shortage of cadaveric
organs, long waiting times on cadaveric transplant waiting lists, better outcomes for recipients, low risk
for donors, and the right to donate all support the use of living donors, while other physicians quote
from the Hippocratic oath and believe that physicians should not contribute to the risk of adverse
outcomes to any patient, that short term risks are not low, that long term risks are unknown, and that
potential donors should not be put under such psychological pressure to undergo major surgery when
it is not physiologically beneficial to them); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Victoria Weisz, Craig M. Lawson,
Advancing The Rights Of Children And Adolescents To Be Altruistic: Bone Marrow Donation By
Minors, 9 J.L. & Health 213, 218 (1995) [hereinafter Robbennolt et al.] ("[l]t is unclear whether a
parent may give legal consent for their child to undergo a bone marrow harvest in order to benefit a
sibling."); Arthur L. Caplan, Am I My Brother's Keeper?, 27 Suffolk U. L Rev. 1195 (1993)
[hereinafter Caplan] (discussing the propriety of living organ donation).
9. An individual is considered a "minor" until he or she reaches the age of "majority." In
Louisiana, "(m]ajority is attained upon reaching the age of eighteen years." La. Civ. Code art. 29. See
also La. Ch. C. art. 603(5) ('Child' means a person under eighteen years of age who, prior to juvenile
proceedings, has not been judicially emancipated under Civil Code Article 385 or emancipated by
marriage under Civil Code Article 379 through 384."); Jessica A. Penkower, The Potential Right Of
Chronically Ill Adolescents To Refuse Life-Saving Medical Treatment-Fatal Misuse Of The Mature
Minor Doctrine, 45 DePaul L Rev. 1165, 1166 n.6 (1996) [hereinafter Penkower] (citing authority for
the proposition that the age of majority in all states is now 18). Moreover, "minors" fall within the
broader category of "incompetents." The term "incompetents" includes several subcategories of
individuals who, for various reasons, are incapable of giving legal effect to their preferences. See,
generally Black's Law Dictionary 765 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "incompetency").
10. There were ten reported living kidney donations by minors in 1995 and thirty-three in 1998,
a tripling in number over three years. See UNOS's website, supra note 2. At this time, there is no
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This article explores the current legal framework within which living organ and
tissue donations by minors occur and concludes that legislation such as that
proposed in this article is desperately needed to protect the physiological and
psychological health of minors. The current judicial standards are inadequate
because they merely regulate the disposition of the donation under review and, thus,
fail to provide any substantive protection for the welfare of all donating minors."
On the other hand, the legislation proposed in this article ensures that the best
interests of all donating minors are protected by requiring judicial approval of all
living organ and tissue donations by minors which are not regulated by other law.
Moreover, the proposed legislation-which encompasses two standards, namely,
a standard for living organ and nonregenerative tissue donations by minors and a
standard for living regenerative tissue donations by minors-lists several factors
which may be considered by an adjudicating court in determining the propriety of
a particular donation. While the two proposed legislative standards are nearly
identical, they differ in one important respect. The proposed legislative standard
for living regenerative tissue donations by minors accords greater deference to the
donating minor's parents. The deference to parental authority is implemented in
the form of a rebuttable presumption (operative under certain circumstances) that
the living regenerative tissue donation is in the best interests of the donating minor.
Section I of this article preludes the following sections by briefly discussing
the medical implications of living organ and tissue donations by minors. This
section discusses what human organs and tissues are transplantable and how these
organs and tissues are medically distinguishable. Particular attention is placed on
distinguishing between regenerative and nonregenerative transplantable body parts
and describing the medical risks associated with living organ and tissue donations.
Section II provides an overview of the constitutional implications of living organ
and tissue donations by minors and concludes that legislation such as that proposed
by this article is constitutional. Section III discusses how living organ and tissue
donations by minors are regulated nationally, with emphasis placed on the problems
associated with this regulating approach. Section IV gives an overview of cases
involving organ and tissue donations by minors. Section V introduces and
thoroughly discusses the proposed legislative standards for regulating living organ
and tissue donations by minors. Finally, this article concludes by reiterating the
need for legislation to regulate living organ and tissue donations by minors and
explaining how the legislation proposed in this article can protect minors as the
number of per year living organ and tissue donations continues to rise.
UNOS data on the number of living kidney donations by minors past 1998; however, UNOS reports
a substantial increase in per year number of living organ donations since 1998, therefore, it is
reasonable to assume that the number of per year living kidney donations by minors has also risen since
1998. See supra notes 6 and 7. While there is no comparable data on the rising number of tissue
donations by minors, several hospitals and clinics throughout Louisiana were contacted and reported
performing an increasing number of hone marrow transplants with minor donors.
I1. Black's Law Dictionary 1404 (6th ed. 1990) defines "standard" as "[a] measure or rule
applicable in legal cases such as the 'standard of care' in tort actions."
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I. MEDICAL IMPLICATIONS OF LIVING ORGAN AND TISSUE DONATIONS BY MINORS
The human body has approximately thirty transplantable organs and tissues
combined. 2 These organs and tissues include: a variety of glands (e.g., pancreas,
pituitary, thyroid, parathyroid, and adrenal), parts of the ear, blood vessels, tendons,
cartilage, muscles (including the heart), testicles, ovaries, fallopian tubes, nerves,
skin, fat, bone marrow, blood, livers, lungs, kidneys, and corneas." Transplantable
organs and tissues are either regenerative or nonregenerative.' 4 Transplantable
regenerative body parts are replenished by the body and usually include only tissues
such as blood, ovum, skin, bone marrow, and spern." Transplantable
nonregenerative body parts are not replenished by the body and include organs such
as the heart and kidneys and tissues such as the lobe of a lung.'6
When a transplantable organ or tissue is donated by a living minor, the
donation is usually made to a sibling. Moreover, the organ or tissue donated is
usually either a kidney, a nonregenerative organ, blood or bone marrow (both of
which are regenerative tissues).' 7 Data released by UNOS, which covers the period
of-1989 to 1998, reveal that only two living organ donations by a minor have been
of an organ other than a kidney.' However, living adult donors have donated other
organs, including a lobe of a lung, a portion of the liver, and a portion of the
12. See Gloria J. Banks, Legal& Ethical Safeguards: Protection Of Society's Most Vulnerable
Participants In A Commercialized Organ Transplantation System, 21 Am. J.L. & Med. 45,46 (1995)
[hereinafter Banks]; Christine Allgeier, Organ Donation: A Review Ofissues And Laws, 71 Radiologic
Technology 23 (1999) [hereinafter Ailgeicr]. For a table of the history of transplantation, see
TransWeb's website, supra note I.
13. Id. See also Cheryl Johnston, Winding Yet Certain Growth, (visited June 9, 2000)
<http://www.stadtlander.com/transplant/tishabruni.html> (describing living lung donation and stating
that "[I]iving-related lung lobe transplants were first performed in 1990 to stop imminent death in
patients with failing lungs too sick to wait for cadaveric organs"); HIV and Hepatitis.com's website,
(visited June 9,2000) <http://www.hivandhepatitis.conhepb/bO000012.html> (describing living liver
donation); see TransWeb's website, supra note 1, for a description of what tissues can be donated
("Currently transplanted human tissues include bone, comeas, skin, heart valves, veins, cartilage and
other connective tissues. These tissues can be used to treat patients suffering from congenital defects,
blindness, visual impairment, trauma, bums, dental defects, arthritis, cancer, vascular and heart disease.
Many heart valves are used to treat children with congenital defects of their own heart valves.").
14. See Jeffrey Prottas, Human Tissues As Medical Treatment, 65 S. Cal. L Rev. 445,445-46
(1991); Banks, supra note 12, at 46; Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing The Supply Of Transplant Organs:
The Virtues Of A Futures Market, 58 Geo. Wash. L Rev. 1, 3 (1989).
15. Id. However,'the human liver, an organ, has the ability to regenerate itself. See HIV and
Hepatitis.com's website, supra note 13 (describing living liver donation).
16. Id.
17. A living kidney donor who is the sibling of the donee-recipient is more likely to have a kidney
that "biologically matches"-this is due to histocompatibility, which refers to the compatibility of
tissues. There is a 25% chance that siblings will be completely identical as regards histocompatibility
(HLA) antigens. The only better, albeit rare, combination is that of identical twins. See Transplant
Square's website, supra note 6. The same phenomena applies to bone marrow donation. Close
relatives, especially siblings, are more likely than unrelated persons to have "matched" bone marrow.
However, only 30% to 40 % of patients have a "matched" sibling or parent. Id.; see also, Gale
Encyclopedia Of Medicine 1700 (I st ed. 1999).
18. See UNOS's website, supra note 2.
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pancreas.' 9 Data on the donation of tissue are not as prevalent as data on organ
donation because there is no central registry for donative tissue;2" however, medical
and legal literature only discuss the donation of blood and bone marrow by minors,
which gives rise to a fair assumption that blood and bone marrow are the primary,
if not the exclusive, tissues currently donated by living minors.
The medical risks associated with living organ and tissue donations vary
according to the body part donated. However, all living donations entail some pain
and discomfort for the donor and include such risks as wound infections, urinary
tract infections, phlebitis, and isolated cases of pulmonary embolism or wound
bleeding.2' There is also the potential risk that a living donor may suffer negative
psychological feelings of resentment if the donee-recipient's body rejects the
donated body part.22 Aside from these universal risks, living organ and tissue
donations are quite safe.' The mortality rate for living kidney donation is
extremely low-around 0.03-0.06 percent.24 The risks associated with blood
19. Id.
20. However, there is a central registry for bone marrow in the United States and many other
countries. In the United States, call I -800-MARROW-2 (1-800-627-7692)or visit the National Marrow
Donor Program website, (visited June 6, 2000) <http://www.marow.org>. Also, see the list of bone
marrow donor centers in the United States compiled by the American Bone Marrow Donor Registry,
(visited June 6, 2000) <http://www.abmdr.org>. There is also another listing of bone marrow donor
centers, (visited June 6,2000) <http://www.slip.net/-rwwood/centers.html>.
21. See UNOS's website, supra note 2; Transplant Square's website, supra note 6.
22. Id.
23. When all living organ donations are factored in, the mortalityrate is estimated at 0.06%. See
UNOS's website, supra note 2.
24. See Transplant Square's website, supra note 6. For further information conceming the risks
associated with living kidney donation for the donor, see TransWeb's website, supra note I:
The evidence is very strong that people without a predisposition to kidney disease (not
diabetic, normal blood pressure, normal kidney anatomy) have a very low likelihood of
developing kidney failure because they donated a kidney. In fact, the likelihood of
developing kidney failure after donating a kidney is likely to be significantly less than the
rest of the population. While this sounds incredible, it is because of the fact that the
population of people that donate a kidney have been carefully screened and those people that
are destined to develop kidney failure have been excluded from donating. Therefore it is not
surprising to find that the chance of renal failure is lower among this group that is healthier
than the population at large.
For a description of kidney transplantation, see Gale Encyclopedia Of Medicine 1700 (1 st ed. 1999);
Ann Carter, Chronic Kidney Failure, Clinical Reference Systems, July 1, 1999, at 287; Jay 1. Meltzer,
Kidney Transplantation, The Columbia Univ. Coll. Of Physicians & Surgeons Complete Home Medical
Guide, 707 (3d ed. 1995). The surgical procedure to remove a kidney from a living donor is called a
nephrectomy. Laparoscopic nephrectomy is an alternative to the traditional nephrectomy and involves
a minimally-invasive surgery using instruments on long, narrow rods to view, cut, and remove the donor
kidney. Although this surgical technique takes slightly longer than a traditional nephrectomy,
preliminary studies show that it promotes a faster recovery time, shorter hospital stays, and less post-
operative pain for kidney donors. Id. See also Charles W. Henderson, Living-Donor Transplants Now
Being Done Laparoscopically, Transplant Weekly, Nov. 15, 1999. For information concerning the
costs ofnephrectomy, see Charles W. Henderson, Transplants From Living Donors Reduce Long- Term
Costs Of Care, Transplant Weekly, May 31, 1999 (reporting a study which suggests that the total cost
of care within five years of transplant surgery is roughly $47,000 less than dialysis treatments would
be for five years). See also Charles W. Henderson, Less Long-Term Care Needed With Well-Matched
2001]
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donation are nonfatal and include such complications as hyperventilation, increased
heart rate, infection, hematoma, seizures, and convulsions." The risks associated
with bone marrow donation are principally caused by the anesthesia administered
to the donor-a risk inherent in nearly all living organ and tissue donations.2' The
mortality rate for bone marrow donation is approximately 0.01 percent, consistent
with the mortality rate for anesthesia administrations." Aside from the risks
associated with anesthesia, bone marrow donation entails a slight risk of bone
fracture, bone infection, artery rupture, skin scarring, and the inherent risks
associated with blood transfusion, should it be necessary.'
II. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF LIVING ORGAN AND TISSUE DONATIONS
BY MINORS
A. The Rights of Minors
Minors are protected by the United States Constitution and possess constitutional
rights." One of the most important rights held by minors is the right of privacy,
Donor Organs, Transplant Weekly, May 31, 1999; Charles W. Henderson, Live Kidney Donors.Could
Hold Key To Organ Shortage, Transplant Weekly, Mar. 1, 1999.
25. See American Association Of Bloodbanks Technical Manual 99-101 (13th ed. 1999).
26. See Gale Encyclopedia Of Medicine 497 (Ist ed. 1999) (discussing bone marrow
transplantation).
27. Id. See also Bone Marrow Transplantation And Peripheral Blood Stem Cell Transplantation,
National Cancer Institute, Nov. 1994 (pamphlet); Gale Encyclopedia Of Medicine 311 (1st ed. 1999);
Evaluation And Preparation Of Pediatric Patients Undergoing Anesthesia, 98 Pediatrics 502 (1996),
which describes the risks associated with anesthesia in children as follows:
Minor complications such as sore throat, nausea, vomiting, croup, and oral trauma are
frequently quoted to patients. Major complications would include dental trauma,
postoperative apnea, major drug reaction, aspiration pneumonia, hypoxemia, arrhythmias,
and cardiac arrest. In a 1985 study examining outcome data from a large general patient
population, the incidence of cardiac arrest caused solely by anesthesia was approximately
1.7 per 10,000 anesthetics; the death rate was approximately I per 10,000 anesthetics.
[citation omitted]. The incidence of cardiac arrest in children younger than 12 years (4.7 per
10,000) was three times greater than in adults (1.4 per 10,000). In a 1988 study, Tiret et al.
[citation omitted] reported on the incidence of major anesthesia-related complications,
defined as any fatal or life-threatening event or any incident resulting in severe sequelae that
occurred during or within 24 hours of administration of anesthesia. They reported the
incidence of such major complications to be 7 per 10,000 anesthetics administered and only
I death in 40,000 anesthetics administered to children younger than 15 years. In children
younger than 12 months, the incidence of major complications was 43 per 10,000, compared
with 5 per 10,000 in older children. More serious complications are likely to occur in
patients with predisposing conditions that compromise organ system function.
28. Id. See also Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319,1337 (111. 1990) (quoting Dr. Lechtor for the
three areas of risk to a healthy child who donates bone marrow: "One, the risk of anesthesia per se;
secondly, with a bone marrow harvest there are many times the donors receive blood, so there is the risk
of blood transfusion; and, finally, there are psychological risks that are associated with the
administration of anesthesia."); Robbennolt et al., supra note 8, at 216.
29. See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74, 96 S. Ct. 2831,
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emanating from the Fifth and Fourteenth Anendments. 3° However, minors do not
possess the fill panoply of constitutional rights enjoyed by adults and often are unable
to exercise their rights independently.3' Minors are endowed with less autonomy under
the law because of their young age; 32 the presumption is that young age reflects
2843 (1976) (discussing right of mature minor to consent to an abortion); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622,633, 99 S. Ct. 3035,3043 (1979) (discussing right of mature minor to consent to an abortion); In
reGault, 387 U.S. 1, 13,87 S. Ct. 1428,1436 (1967) (extending procedural rights ofrnotice, of counsel,
and of protection against self-incrimination to minors) ("IN either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the
Bill of Rights is for adults alone."); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 689,97 S. Ct. 2010,
2018 (1976) (blanket prohibition on the distribution of contraceptives to minors is unconstitutional);
Parham v. JR., 442 U.S. 584, 600, 99 S. Ct. 2493, 2503 (1979) ("It is not disputed that a child, in
common with adults, has a substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for medical
treatment .... "); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511, 89 S. Ct.
733, 739 (1969) (First Amendment) ("Students in school as well as out of school are 'persons' under
our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they
themselves must respect their obligations to the State."); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 242, 92
S. Ct. 1526, 1546 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Where the child is mature enough to express
potentially conflicting desires, it would be an invasion of the child's rights to permit such an imposition
without canvassing his views."); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,88-89, 120 S. Ct. 2054,2072 (2000)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens states:
At a minimum, our prior cases recognizing that children are, generally speaking,
constitutionally protected actors require that this Court reject any suggestion that when it
comes to parental rights, children are so much chattel. The constitutional protection against
arbitrary state interference with parental rights should not be extended to prevent the States
from protecting children against the arbitrary exercise of parental authority that is not in fact
motivated by an interest in the welfare of the child. (citation omitted).
See also Rochelle D. Jackson, The War Over Children's Rights: And Justice For All? Equalizing The
Rights Of Children, 5 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 223 (1999).
30. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,93 S. Ct. 705 (1973) (establishing the contours of the right
of privacy in the abortion context); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,96
S. Ct. 2831 (1976) (right of mature minor to consent to an abortion); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,
99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979) (right of mature minor to consent to an abortion); Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (recognizing a woman's
right to choose an abortion before fetal viability, but adopting an undue burden test for evaluating
abortion restrictions before viability). For a discussion on the substantive component of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986). The Court
in Bowers states:
It is true that despite the language of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, which appears to focus only on the processes by which life, liberty, or
property is taken, the cases are legion in which those Clauses have been interpreted to have
substantive content, subsuming rights that to a great extent are immune from federal or state
regulation or proscription.
Id. at 191, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
31. See Vemonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,654,115 S. Ct. 2386,2391(1995) (Fourth
Amendment) ("Traditionally at common law, and still today, unemancipated minors lack some of the
most fundamental rights of self-determination-including even the right of liberty in its narrow sense,
i.e., the right to come and go at will."); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266, 108 S.
Ct. 562, 567 (1988) (First Amendment) ("We have nonetheless recognized that the First Amendment
rights of students in the public schools 'are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in
other settings[]'....").
32. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602, 99 S. Ct. 2493,2504(1979).
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inexperience and an inability to fully comprehend the ramifications of the chosen
action.33 This reasoning has shaped the law pertaining to medical consent, which
traditionally has held that minors may not effectively consent to their medical
treatment.34 And without consent, any medical procedure performed on a minor is
considered a battery. 5 Therefore, the law delegates the power to make medical care
33. Id. at 602,99 S. Ct. at 2504. See also Belotti, 443 U.S. at 634,99 S. Ct. at 3043 ("We have
recognized three reasons justifying the conclusion that the constitutional Tights of children cannot be
equated with those of adults: the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical
decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing.");
Emily Buss, What Does Frieda Yoder Believe?, 2 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 53 (1999). Whether the law's
presumptions pertaining to minors are grounded in accurate social science is, however, an issue often
debated. See Preston A. Britneret al., EvaluatingJuveniles" Competence To MakeAbortion Decisions:
How Social Science Can Inform The Law, 5 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 35, 62 (1998) ("Simply put,
the research conducted over the past two decades suggests that adolescents are more similar than
dissimilar to adults in their decision-making, although some differences may exist."); Maggie
O'Shaughnessy, The Worst Of rBoth Worlds?: Parental Involvement Requirements And The Privacy
Rights Of Mature Minors, 57 Ohio St. LJ. 1731, 1733-34 (1996) ("While the Court has rejected the
proposition that pregnant minors must be presumed mature enough to make their pregnancy disposition
decision, the weight of research provides a convincing challenge to this position by showing that minors
exhibit adult-level reasoning."); Susan D. Hawkins, Protecting The Rights And Interests Of Competent
Minors In Litigated Medical Treatment Disputes, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 2075, 2128-29 (1996)
[hereinafter Hawkins]. Hawkins states:
Regardless of the standard employed to assess competence, many medical commentators
agree that minors under the age of fourteen should not be permitted to consent to or refuse
treatment on their own behalf. By contrast, others reconmend a case-by-case determination
of a minor's capacity to consent and recommend involving her in the decision-making
process to a degree commensurate with her current capacity.
Id.
34. See Hawkins, supra note 33, at 2075 ("In the United States, minors are generally considered
legally incompetent to consent to or refuse most forms of medical treatment."). The granting of
"consent" should be contrasted from the granting of"informed consent." One may grant"consent," but
not "informed consent," to a medical procedure; however, if one grants 'inforned consent," they have
also granted "consent." See Black's Law Dictionary 305 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "consent" as
"permission") and Black's Law Dictionary 779 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "informed consent" as "[a]
person's agreement to allow something to happen (such as surgery) that is based on a full disclosure of
facts needed to make the decision intelligently; i.e., knowledge of risks involved, alternatives, etc.
Informed consent is the name for a general principle of law that a physician has a duty to disclose what
a reasonably prudent physician in the medical community in the exercise of reasonable care would
disclose to his patient as to whatever grave risks of injury might be incurred from a proposed course of
treatment, so that a patient, exercising ordinary care for his own welfare, and faced with a choice of
undergoing the proposed treatment, or alternative treatment, or none at all, may intelligently exercise
his judgment by reasonably balancing the probable risks against the probable benefits.").
35. See Neil C. Abramson, A Right To Privacy Tour De Force Into Louisiana Medical Informed
Consent, 51 La. L. Rev. 755, 756 (1991). Abramson states:
The general rule is that a physician must obtain his patient's consent, expressed or implied,
to a medical procedure before performing a procedure. A patient's cause of action for lack
of consent arises in intentional torts, i.e., battery, forthe performance ofprocedures different
from or in excess of those to which he has consented. A patient's cause of action for lack
of informed consent, however, arises in negligence. In these situations, the physician
performs the procedure to which his patient consented, but the physician fails to disclose to
his patient certain risks and results involved in the procedure.
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decisions for minors to surrogate decision-makers, such as parents.36 The surrogate
decision-maker's consent serves as a substitute for the minor's consent and ensures
that the minor's liberty interests are protected and thus respected.
On the other hand, while requiring the consent of a surrogate decision-maker
provides an effective tool for guarding the rights of a minor, it also creates an
obstacle which may prevent a minor from obtaining the medical treatment he needs.
If surrogate consent is required under all circumstances before needed medical
treatment may be provided, the health of minors, and the stability of society would
be foolishly sacrificed. To ameliorate the potentially harsh consequences of the
general rule of surrogate consent, courts have crafted several jurisprudential
exceptions. State legislators have also enacted several statutory exceptions to the
general rule of surrogate consent.37 Statutes in most states now permit health care
providers to render emergency medical treatment to minors without surrogate
Id. For a further discussion on the distinctions between consent and informed consent in Louisiana, see
Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398 (La. 1988) (discussing the cause of action for lack of
informed consent) and Pizzalotto v. Wilson, 437 So. 2d 859 (La. 1983) (performance of a medical
procedure on the body of a patient without consent is a battery). See also Kallich & Merz, supra note
8, at 148-51; Danny R. Veilleux, Medical Practitioner's Liability For Treatment Given Child Without
Parent's Consent, 67 A.L.R. 4th 511 (1989) (discussing several cases).
36. See Susan C. Lonowski, Recognizing The Right Of Terminally-Ill Mature Minors To Refuse
Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment: The Need For Legislative Guidelines To Give Full Effect To
Minors' Expanded Rights, 34 U. Louisville J. Faro. L. 421 (1996) ("Courts commonly allow parents,
legal guardians or court-appointed surrogates to make decisions regarding medical treatment of
children."); La. R.S. 40:1299.53 (2000) (granting a parent the authority and power, on behalf of his or
her minor child, "to consent, either orally or otherwise, to any surgical or medical treatment or
procedures including autopsy not prohibited by law which may be suggested, recommended, prescribed,
or directed by a duly licensed physician"). See also La. Ch. C. art. 116(17) ("'Parent' means any living
person who is presumed to be a parent under Civil Code Articles 184 through 190, a biological or
adoptive mother or father of a child.").
37. For a complete discussion on the jurisprudential and statutory exceptions, see generally
Penkower, supra note 9 (discussing the jurisprudential exceptions of emergency, emancipated minor,
and mature minor); Jennifer L Rosato, The Ultimate Test Of Autonomy: Should Minors Have A Right
To Make Decisions Regarding Life.Sustaining Treatment?, 49 Rutgers L. Rev. I (1996) [hereinafter
Rosato]; Nancy Batterman, UnderAge: A Minor 's Right To Consent To Health Care, 10 Touro L Rev.
637 (1994) [hereinafter Batterman]. The emergency exception is ajurisprudential exception recognized
in every state. The first case in Louisiana to recognize the emergency exception is Wells v. McGehee,
39 So. 2d 196, 202 (La. App. I st Cir. 1949) ("In such a case, where the emergency endangers the life
or health of the patient, it is the surgeon's duty to do that which the case demands within the usual and
customary practice among physicians and surgeons in the same or similar localities, without the consent
of the patient or his parents."). The other two jurisprudential exceptions, the emancipated minor
exception and the mature minor exception, are found in the common law of most states, but have never
been recognized in the civil law of Louisiana. These common law exceptions permit minors to consent
to their own medical care and obviate the need for obtaining surrogate consent. Moreover, when
properly employed, these common law exceptions permit a minor to make the relevant medical care
decision notwithstanding the wishes of the minor's parents. In Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 ,99 S.
Ct. 3035 (1979), the United States Supreme Court raised the common law mature minor exception to
constitutional status in the limited context of permitting minors to consent to abortions. Application
and effect of the exception is the same in common law and constitutional law-if the minor is found
competent, there is no need to obtain surrogate consent and the minor's parents do not retain a veto over
the minor's medical care decision.
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consent.3" Moreover, statutes in many states now permit minors to make their own
medical care decisions if they have established independence through marriage,.
parenthood, or service in the armed forces. 9 Statutes in many states also permit
minors to consent to their medical treatment with respect to specific diseases or
conditions.' In a few states, such as Louisiana, minors are broadly permitted to
consent to any "medical or surgical care or services" in conjunction with an "illness
or disease." 1
The exceptions to the general rule of surrogate consent were not created to
grant autonomous rights to minors. Rather, the exceptions were created to ftrther
paternalistic goals by allocating consensual authority in a way that ensures minors
obtain needed medical treatment.42 Thus, while minors may have the right to
38. In Louisiana, see La. R.S. 40:1299.54 (2000) (stating in part that "[i]n addition to any other
instances in which a consent is excused or implied at law, a consent to surgical or medical treatment
or procedures suggested, recommended, prescribed, or directed by a duly licensed physician will be
implied where an emergency exists.").
39. See Judith C. Areen, Cases And Materials On Family Law 1030-31 (2d ed. 1985); La. Civ.
Code art. 379 ("The minor, whether male or female, is emancipated of right by marriage."); La. Civ.
Code art. 385 (judicial emancipation); La. Civ. Code art. 366 (emancipation by notarial act).
40. In Louisiana, see, e.g., La. R.S. 40:1065.1 (2000) (minor may consent for treatment of
venereal diseases); La. R.S. 40:1096 (2000) (minor may consent for treatment of drug abuse); La. R.S.
40:1098.3 (2000) (minor may consent forpreventive alcoholism and addiction counseling and treatment
for alcohol or drug abuse).
41. See La. R.S. 40:1095(A) (2000), which provides:
Consent to the provision ofmedical or surgical care or services by a hospital or public clinic,
or to the performance of medical or surgical care or services by a physician, licensed to
practice medicine in this state, when executed by a minor who is or believes himself to be
afflicted with an illness or disease, shall be valid and binding as if the minor had achieved
his majority. Any such consent shall not be subject to a later disaffirmance by reason of his
minority.
42. See Penkower, supra note 9, at 1205-06. Penkower states:
Paternalism is at the heart of all legal policies governing allocation of consensual rights in
the health care context. The common law rules requiring parental consent for the treatment
of minors, and their exceptions, further paternalistic goals by allocating decision-making
capacity in a way that yields maximum benefit not only to the specific minor whose
treatment is at issue, but to the general public as well. For example, exceptions to the
common law rule under emergency circumstances were premised on the idea that it is
always in the best interests of a child to receive prompt medical attention when his or her
health or life is endangered. Similarly, minor treatment statutes were enacted in response
to society's fear that minors would rather suffer from sexually transmitted diseases, alcohol
and substance abuse, and mental disorders than risk the consequences of consulting their
parents, who may be angry, accusative, or unsupportive. Finally, in the abortion context,
it was feared that if minors were denied access to legal abortions, they would alternatively
seek potentially harmful illegal abortions.
Id. Jonathan 0. Hafen & Bruce C. Hafen, Abandoning Children To Their Autonomy: The United
Nations Convention On The Rights Of The Child, 37 Harv. Int'l LJ. 449,454-55 (1996) ("Thus, with
the exception of abortion choices by minors found to be 'mature,' virtually all of the modem American
children's rights cases have been concerned not with children's rights of autonomous personal choice,
but with their rights to protection."); Rosato, supra note 37, at 31. Rosato states:
The condition or disease exception does not appear to be motivated by a desire to recognize
a minor's right to make certain health care decisions. For many of these conditions,
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consent to medical treatment in many states, they usually do not have the right to
refuse medical treatment when that treatment is consented to by the minors'
parents.43 Moreover, generally, if consensual authority is extended to a minor, that
authority does not include the right to consent to nontherapeutic medical procedures
such as living organ or tissue donations."
B. The Rights of Parents
Parents have a fundamental constitutional right to make medical care decisions
concerning their minor children.45 However, parental authority is not without
including venereal disease, drug abuse, and mental health problems, the exception exists
because requiring parental consent may discourage a minor from seeking treatment. If the
minor failed to seek treatment, the minor's health or the welfare of the community could be
jeopardized. For example, a minor's failure to obtain pregnancy-related services because
of a fear of parental reprisals could detrimentally affect the health of the mother and the
unborn child. Additionally, the failure to treat venereal disease could cause the spread of
the disease, thus causing harm to the community.
Id. See also Batterman, supra note 37, at 639-40.
43. See 40 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 88-232 (Nov. 16, 1988) ("A minor, while having the right to
consent to medical treatment, has no right to refuse medical treatment when that treatment is consented
to by his parents and proposed by a licensed physician."); Rosato, supra note 37, at 32. Rosato states:
The statutes also may be limited to consent to treatment. Most of the statutes apply to
consent to treatment, but do not refer to refusal of treatment at all. By specifically including
consent and excluding refusal, the legislature may have intended to allow minors only to
consent to treatment. This reading would be consistent with the state's interest in protecting
children's lives because it would prevent a minor from refusing necessary health care, and
thus would prevent self-inflicted harm.
Id. However, most adults do have a right to refuse medical treatment. In Louisiana, see La. R.S.
40:1299.56 (2000) ("Nothing contained herein shall be construed to abridge any right of a person
eighteen years of age or over to refuse to consent to medical or surgical treatment as to his own
person.").
44. See Batterman, supra note 37, at 672-73 (stating that when the treatment is for the minor's
own benefit rather than for the benefit of another, courts are more receptive to finding the minor's
consent legally sufficient). A "nontherapeutic" medical procedure does not provide any direct medical
benefit to the patient. See Janet B. Korins, Curran v. Bosze: TowardA Clear Standard ForAuthorizing
Kidney And Bone Marrow Transplants Between Minor Siblings, 16 Vt. L Rev. 499, 500 n.6 (1992)
[hereinafter Korins]. A careful reading of La. R.S. 40:1095(A) (2000) reveals that Louisiana minors
may only consent to "medical or surgical care or services" in conjunction with treatment for an actual
or perceived affliction of an "illness or disease." However, blood donation statutes are the typical
exception to the rule that minors may not consent to nontherapeutic medical procedures. In Louisiana,
see La. R.S. 40:1097 (2000) (seventeen-year-old minor may consent to donation of blood). Two states,
Alabama and Wisconsin, have made a further exception to the rule by allowing minors to consent to
bone marrow donation. See Ala. Code § 22-8-9 (West 2000) and Wis. Stat. Ann. § 146.34 (West 2000),
discussed at infra note 61. Moreover, an exception to the rule also applies with respect to abortion. In
Louisiana, see La. R.S. 40:1299.35.5 (2000) (mature minor may consent to an abortion).
45. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66,120 S. Ct. 2054,2060 (2000) ("[I]t cannot now be
doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of
parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children."); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 1541 (1972) (upholding the decision by Amish parents to
withdraw their children from public school after a careful balancing of parental and state interests and
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bounds. Parents have neither a constitutional right to withhold needed medical
treatment for their minor children nor a constitutional right to expose their
minor children to the medical risks associated with nontherapeutic medical
procedures, such as living organ or tissue donations."'
stating: "The history and culture of Western Civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern
for the nurture and upbringing of their children."); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35,
45 S. Ct. 571, 573 (1925) (striking down a law requiring attendance at public schools due to
interference with the "liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing of children under their
control"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S. Ct. 625, 626 (1923) (striking down a law
prohibiting the teaching of German and holding that the liberty interest protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment included the right to "bring up children"); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602, 99 S. Ct.
2493, 2504 (1979) ("Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the
family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children."). In Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,
638, 99 S. Ct. 3035, 3045 (1979), the Court stated:
[W]e cannot ignore that... deeply rooted in our Nation's history and tradition ... is the
belief that the parental role implies a substantial measure of authority over one's children.
Indeed, "constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to
authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the
structure of our society."
Id. (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639, 88 S. Ct. 1274, 1280 (1968). Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S. Ct. 438, 442 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody,
care, and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 495, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 1688 (1965) (striking down a Connecticut law interfering with the right to
use contraceptives, and holding: "[T]he entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that clearly
underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate that the rights to marital privacy and to marry and raise a
family are of similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically protected."). See also
La. Civ. Code art. 216 ("A child remains under the authority of his father and mother until his majority
or emancipation. In case of difference between the parents, the authority of the father prevails.");
Hawkins, supra note 33, at 2081:
Because society values privacy and family integrity, courts accord great deference to
parental decisions. Two presumptions drive such deference to parental authority. First,
courts believe that "parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity
for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions." Second, lawmakers presume
that the "natural bonds of affection" cause parents to act in their child's best interests.
Courts also recognize that parental autonomy in decision making is an essential element of
preserving integrity of the family.
46. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 1542 (1972) ("[The power
of the parent ... may be subject to (significant] limitationls. ... if it appears that parental decisions
will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant societal burdens.").
See also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.57, 68-69, 120 S. Ct. 2054,2061 (2000) ("Accordingly, so long
as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for
the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent
to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's children.") (emphasis added); Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170, 64 S. Ct. 438, 444 (1944). Moreover, see Leslie A. Fithian,
Forcible Repatriation Of Minors: The Competing Rights Of Parent And Child, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 187,
200-01 (1984), stating:
The state has never allowed parents unlimited control over their children, however. Parental
rights, though constitutionally protected from unwarranted state intervention, are still subject
to the superior right of the state to protect children against abuse of parental authority.
Under the parens patriae doctrine, the state shares the duty of parents to safeguard the
welfare of children and may intervene when parents fail to meet this obligation.
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C. The Rights of the State
The state has a strong interest in the preservation of human life."7
Generally, whenever the actions of an individual threaten this interest, the state
is permitted to intervene and protect the sanctity of human life. Moreover, the
state has an important interest in protecting individuals who are unable to
protect themselves, such as minors.' Therefore, the state may usurp the
authority of parents under its parens patriae"9 power when the health of a minor
is endangered.5"
The state usually protects the health of minors through its child abuse and neglect
statutes." In many states, these statutes permit the state to obtain temporary legal
custody of minors in order to compel necessary medical treatment.'2 Aside from the
child abuse and neglect statutes, a state may also protect the health of minors by
enacting protectionist legislation that proscribes medical procedures which pose what
might be considered too great a health risk for minors.
47. In Louisiana, see, e.g., La. R.S. 14:29 (defining the crime of homicide) and 14:32.5 (defining
the crime of feticide) (2000).
48. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977) (discussing the
state's protective power over minors) and Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,64 S. Ct. 438 (1944)
(discussing the state's interest in protecting the welfare of children).
49. "Parens patriae" literally means "parent of the country." Black's Law Dictionary 1114 (6th
ed. 1990) defines "parens patiae" as the "principle that the state must care for those who cannot take
care of themselves, such as minors who lack proper care and custody from their parents." See also
Ready v. State Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 707 So. 2d 1250,1260 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1997),
writ denied, 720 So. 2d 687 (La. 1908), ("Clearly, the state, as parens patriae, may interfere with a
parent's custody under certain circumstances ....").
50. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 170, 64 S. Ct. at 444 ("Parents may be free to become martyrs
themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their
children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice
for themselves."); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,649,92 S. Ct. 1208, 1212 (1972) (state has power
to assert the child's best interests); In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 801 (Cal. App. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 949, 100 S. Ct. 1597 (1980) ("One of the most basic values protected by the state is
the sanctity of human life. Where parents fail to provide their children with adequate medical care, the
state is justified to intervene."). The state intervenes into matters involving the health of minors for
three basic reasons. First, intervention ensures the continuance of society by protecting minors so that
they may later contribute as productive citizens and, in-turn, ensure the well-being of future posterity.
Second, intervention ensures the efficient allocation of limited fiscal and administrative resources. The
state must preserve its limited resources and thus has an interest in preventing minor children from
becoming wards of the state. Third, intervention ensures the integrity of the medical profession.
Unchecked parental authority over medical decisions regarding minors could have a deleterious impact
on the respect and trust accorded the medical profession. Considering the vital role that the medical
profession plays in today's society, the state's interest in protecting this vitality is paramount. See
Matthew S. Feigenbaum, Minors. Medical Treatment, And Interspousal Disagreement: Should
Solomon Split The Child?, 41 DePaul L. Rev. 841, 857-58 (1992).
51. In Louisiana, see La. Ch. C. arts. 601,606.
52. See Hawkins, supra note 33, at 2079. In Louisiana, see La. Ch. C. arts. 1551, 1553
(deprivation of comfort care prohibited), art. 1554 (deprivation of medical or surgical care generally
prohibited), and art. 1560 (wrongful refusal to consent to medical care and treatment of a child).
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As the above discussion reveals, minors retain some liberty interests with
respect to their bodies." However, the law has assumed a paternalistic role
with regard to minors, extending rights, constitutional or otherwise, and
promulgating legislation in an effort to protect them.' This paternalistic
approach is particularly obvious in medical consent law where the allocation
of consensual rights serves to protect the health of minors and the interests of
society." Consequently, states have extended jurisprudential and statutory
consensual rights to minors permitting them to consent to medical treatment.
But, generally speaking, these rights neither include a correlative right to refuse
medical treatment nor a right to consent to nontherapeutic medical
procedures.' Furthermore, parents have a vested constitutional right to consent
to medical treatment for their minor children, but this constitutional right
includes neither a correlative right to withhold needed medical treatment for
their minor children nor a constitutional right to consent to nontherapeutic
medical procedures for their minor children." These limitations demonstrate
that the state's interest in protecting the health of minors and the stability of
society is paramount; therefore, the state may constitutionally enact legislation
to regulate, including prohibit, living organ and tissue donations by minors.
III. NATIONAL REGULATION OF LIVING ORGAN AND TISSUE DONATIONS BY
MINORS
The approach taken by the United States to regulate living organ and tissue
donations is remarkably different from the European approach."8 While every
53. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. See also Penelope Alysse Brobst, The Court
Giveth And The Court Taketh Away: State v. Fernandez-Returning Louisiana s Children ToAn Adult
Standard, 60 La. L Rev. 605 (2000), citing well over twenty paternalistic laws, including, in pertinent
part, La. R.S. 14:93.11 (2000) ("Unlawful sales to persons under twenty-one is the selling or otherwise
delivering for value of any alcoholic beverage to any person under twenty-one years of age unless such
person is the lawful owner or lawful employee of an establishment to which the sale is being made and
is accepting such delivery pursuant to such ownership or employment."); La. R.S. 14:91.8(c) (2000)
("It is unlawful for any manufacturer, distributor, retailer, or other person knowingly to sell or distribute
any tobacco product to a person under the age of eighteen."); La. R.S. 14:91(A) (2000) ('Unlawful sales
of weapons to minors is the selling or otherwise delivering for value of any firearm or other
instrumentality customarily used as a dangerous weapon to any person under the age of eighteen."); La.
R.S. 14:91.11 (AXi) (2000) ("The unlawful sale, exhibition, rental, leasing, or distribution of material
harmful to minors is the intentional sale, allocation, distribution, advertisement, dissemination,
exhibition, or display of material harmful to minors, to any unmarried person under the age of seventeen
years, or the possession of material harmful to minors with the intent to sell, allocate, advertise,
disseminate, exhibit, or display such material to any unmarried person under the age of seventeen years,
at a newsstand or any other commercial establishment which is open to persons under the age of
seventeen years."); La. R.S. 32:405.1,407 (2000) (restricting right of minors to drive).
55. See supra note 42.
56. See supra notes 43 and 4 and accompanying text.
57. See accompanying text, supra note 46 and accompanying text.
58. Many European countries have specific legislation addressing living organ and tissue
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state has passed the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA), s9 which regulates
cadaveric organ and tissue donations, no state has passed legislation regulating
living organ donation or, more particularly, living organ donation by minors.
Moreover, while most states have passed legislation regulating blood donation
donations by minors. While the age of majority and legislation differs in these countries, generally
European law is less permissive of living organ and tissue donations by minors than by adults: Romania(prohibits the donation of organs and tissues, including blood, by living minors); Spain (prohibits the
donation of organs and tissues, including blood, by living minors); Greece (prohibits living organ
donation by minors, but bone marrow may be donated by minors provided the donating minor and
donee-recipient are fully histocompatible siblings and consent has been obtained from the person legally
responsible for the donating minor); Portugal (living nonregenerative organ and tissue donations by
minors and incompetent adults are prohibited; however, parents may consent to the living donation of
regenerative tissue from their minor children, but when the donating minor is capable of understanding
and able to express his wishes, the consent of the minor must also be obtained); Denmark (living organ
donation is permitted by persons under 18 years of age if the donor has consented, the approval of the
person exercising parental authority over the donor has been obtained, and there are special medical
needs for the particular donation); Norway (living organ donation is permitted by persons under 18
years of age when there exists a special medical need, the minor's guardian has consented, and
permission has been granted by the Directorate of Health Services; in addition, the minor must consent
and understand the nature of the operation and its concomitant risks); Sweden (living organ donation
is permitted by persons under I8 years of age when there are special medical needs for the particular
donation and the donating minor consents; in addition, the authorization of the National Board of
Health and Welfare must be obtained, which is only granted when the person exercising parental
authority consents and the board agrees that there are special medical needs for the particular donation);
Finland (only persons of at least 18 years of age may make living nonregenerative organ and tissue
donations; persons under 18 years of age may consent to living regenerative tissue donations only with
the written consent of the person's guardian or trustee, and approval by'the National Board of Health;
moreover, before any living tissue donation by a minor proceeds, an expert in child psychology or
pediatrics must submit a report to the board to accompany the application for approval of the donation;
the donating minor's opinion on the donation is also considered by the board, with due regard to the
donor's age and level of development); France (minors of any age may make living organ donations,
but only to a brother or sister with the consent of the minor's legal representative and authorization by
an independent committee; the consent of the donating minor is also required if the minor is capable
of reaching an independent decision about whether to donate); Luxembourg (minors of any age may
make living organ donations with the consent of the minor's legal representative and authorization by
an independent committee; the consent of the donating minor is also required if the minor is capable
of reaching an independent decision about whether to donate). The legislation of Bolivia, Colombia,
Mexico, Lebanon, Russia, and Turkey prohibit living organ donation by minors. Moreover, the World
Health Organization (WHO) has established nine guiding principles (i.e., the WHO Guiding Principles
on Human Organ Transplantation) which do not bind members but, nevertheless, provide guidance for
governments and health professionals; Principle 4 calls for the absolute ban of living organ donation
by minors. For citation to the pertinent laws discussed above, see David Price & Austin Garwood-
Gowers, Aspects Of Transplant Laws In European Jurisdictions, Eurotold's website, (visited June 5,
2000) <http://www.maths.lancs.ac.uk/-henderr /EuroTold/Legisearch/#it4>; Maria N. Morelli, Organ
Trafficking: Legislative Proposals To Protect Minors, 10 Am. U. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 917, 935-40 (1995)
[hereinafter Morelli].
59. In Louisiana, see La. R.S. 17:2351 (2000). ForadiscussionoftheUAGA, seeAllgeier, supra
note 12, and Banks, supra note 12, at 64-71. The UAGA primarily prescribes certain mechanics
concerning the giving of anatomical gifts, such as who may give, who may receive, and how the gift
document is executed, delivered, and amended or revoked.
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by minors, 60 no state has passed legislation broadly regulating living tissue
donation by minors.6'
The United States has instead taken a common law approach to regulating
living organ and tissue donations by minors, leaving the power to adjudicate the
disposition of a donation within the purview of a judge's discretion. The
adjudicating courts have purported to apply one of two judicial standards when
reaching their decisions on the propriety of a living organ or tissue donation by a
minor, namely, the "substituted judgment" standard or the "best interests" standard.
A court applying the substituted judgment standard in its purest form attempts
to substitute itself as nearly as possible for the incompetent and to act upon the same
motives and considerations that would move the incompetent but for the
lack of competency.62 Benefit is not a proper element to be considered in making
a substituted judgment; rather, the substituted judgment standard allows a court to
make decisions for the incompetent that may be contrary to the incompetent's best
interests, but which are based on the incompetent's personal preferences.'
3
Therefore, the substituted judgment standard requires that the subjective personal
preferences of the incompetent control what decisions are made for the
incompetent."
However, a court applying the best interests standard in its purest form attempts
to protect the best interests of an incompetent by evaluating benefits and risks in
60. See, e.g., La. R.S. 40:1097 (2000); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2317.54 (West 2000); Ala. Code
§ 26-1-3 (West 2000); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-134 (West 2000); Ark. Code Ann. § 20-27-301 (West
2000); Cal. Faro. Code §§ 25.5 and 6920 (West 2000); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 743.06 (West 2000); Ga. Code
Ann. § 44-5-89 (West 2000); Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-15 (West 2000). See also 21 C.F.R. §§ 640.1 -
640.6, particularly 640.3 (2000) (suitability of donor).
61. However, Alabama and Wisconsin have passed legislation regulating bone marrow donation
by minors. See Ala. Code § 22-8-9 (West 2000) ("Any minor who is 14 years of age or older, or has
graduated from high school, or is married, or having been married is divorced or is pregnant, may give
effective consent to the donation of his or her bone marrow for the purpose of bone marrow
transplantation. A parent or legal guardian may consent to such bone marrow donation on behalfof any
other minor."); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 146.34 (West 2000) (establishing strict requirements whereby minors
under 12 years of age with parental consent may donate their bone marrow to a sibling and also
establishing strict requirements whereby minors 12 years of age or over may consent to donate their
bone marrow to a sibling without the need for parental consent).
62. See City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. McGowan, 323 U.S. 594, 599, 655 S. Ct. 496, 498
(1945); Lynn E. Lebit, Compelled Medical Procedures Involving Minors And Incompetents And
Misapplication Of The Substituted Judgments Doctrine, 7 J.L. & Health 107, 112-19 (1993)
[hereinafter Lebit]; Robbennolt et al., supra note 8, at 221-22. The substituted judgment standard was
conceived in an early English case, Ex parte Whitebread, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (1816). Ex porte
Whitebread did not involve a medical question, but concerned the dilemma of how to justify making
provisions for needy siblings from the estate of an incompetent. The standard was created to authorize
the equity court's exercise of power. The Whitebread court stated: "IThe court will not refuse to do,
for the benefit of the Lunatic, that which it is probable the Lunatic himself would have done." Id. at
879. A New York court was the first in the United States to follow this standard. See In re Willoughby,
II Paige Ch. 257 (N.Y. Ch. 1844) (involving a petition for an allowance from an incompetent's estate).
See also infra notes 67 and 68.
63. See discussion in supra note 62.
64. See discussion in supra note 62.
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order to ascertain the proper course of action.6" Accordingly, the best interests
standard is an objective standard that utilizes logic and reason in reaching decisions
for the incompetent; the personal preferences of the incompetent are not
considered.'
While both the substituted judgment and best interests standard are useful
judicial standards, they are flawed when applied in the context of living organ or
tissue donation by minors. Because minors lack any period of legal competency,
there are no intentional acts from which to draw a personal preference to donate.
Accordingly, the substituted judgment standard cannot be properly applied to
adjudicate the disposition of a living organ or tissue donation by a minor.67
Moreover, because the best interests standard in its purest form fails to consider the
reasonable wishes of the donating minor, it is also inherently flawed when applied
to adjudicate the disposition of a living organ or tissue donation by a minor. The
personal autonomy of the donating minor should be accorded fair respect by at least
factoring in the minor's reasonable wishes. Thus, when a minor, particularly one
near majority, desires to donate his organ or tissue to another, such as his sibling,
the reasonable wishes of the minor should be heard and considered but should not
be determinative."
65. See Korins, supra note 44, at 506-09 ("In theory, the best interest of the donor test provides
a stricter approach because it focuses purely on the objective benefit to the individual donor."); Daniel
B. Griffith, The Best Interests Standard: A Comparison Of The State's Parens Patriae Authority And
Judicial Oversight In Best Interests Determinations For Children And Incompetent Patients, 7 Issues
L & Med. 283 (1991). See also authorities cited at infra notes 67 and 68. The best interests standard
is prevalent throughout family law in varying forms. In Louisiana, see La. Civ. Code arts. 131, 134.
The first significant expression of the best interests standard is found in the late nineteenth century case
of Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650, 654 (Kan. 188 1) ("Above all things, the paramount consideration
is, what will promote the welfare of the child?").
66. See discussion in supra note 65.
67. See Lebit, supra note 62, at 110-11 ("Substituted judgment is a subjective standard, and
therefore can only apply to persons who have been competent at one time. The best interests standard,
however, is to be applied to the minor or incompetent who has never been competent and is, therefore,
entitled to more protection under the law."); David S. Lockemeyer, At What Cost Will The Court
Impose A Duty To Preserve The Life Of A Child?, 39 Clev. St. L. Rev. 577, 586 (1991) ("In the case
of a minor donor, there is no period of competency upon which to base a determination of the donor's
altruism. Therefore, in applying the substituted judgment doctrine in a case involving a minor, a court
is simply applying a form of the best interest test. The court is making a decision based upon its
perception of what a reasonable person would do if he were in the minor's position."); Robbennolt et
al., supra note 8, at 226.
68. See Robbennolt et al., supra note 8, at 226-27 ("[Tlhe best interests standard is itself
unsatisfactory in that it fails to capture the nature of the decision to donate bone marrow and,
accordingly, does not further a respect for the personhood of the children involved. Even very young
children facing bone marrow harvests are often able to understand what is happening and why, at least
on an elementary level."); Rachel M. Dufault, Bone Marrow Donations By Children: Rethinking The
Legal Framework In Light OfCurran v. Bosze, 24 Conn. L. Rev. 211, 244 (1991) [hereinafter Dufault].
See also La. Civ. Code art. 134, wherein "[t]e reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems
the child to be of sufficient age to express a preference[,]" may be considered in awarding custody of
the child and La. Civ. Code art. 136, wherein "[t]he preference of the child[,] if he is determined to be
of sufficient maturity to express a preference[,]" may be considered in awarding visitation rights.
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Despite claims of adherence to one particular standard, many courts
adjudicating the propriety of a living organ or tissue donation by a minor have, in
fact, responded to the flaws inherent in sole application of one of the judicial
standards by incorporating particular aspects of both standards to create a hybrid
standard.' While the applicationofahybridstandardrmayresolve manyofthe problenms
presented by the sole application of either standard, it suffers, as does any
judicial standard, from a lacking ability to regulate the disposition of donations
not before the court. Furthermore, not all courts apply a hybrid standard or
apply it in the same manner. Finally, the courts adjudicating the propriety of
a living organ or tissue donation by a minor have committed themselves to a
unitary legal analysis that fails to distinguish between the various types of
organ and tissue donations. There are, however, important distinctions in organ
and tissue donations, such as regeneration, which necessitate the application of
differing legal analysis.
IV. NATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING LIVING ORGAN AND TISSUE
DONATIONS BY MINORS
UNOS data reveal that there were ninety-six reported living kidney
donations by minors between 1989 and 1998, with donor age ranging from less
than one to seventeen-years-old. ° The total annual number of reported living
kidney donations by minors has been on the rise since 1995 and has doubled in
number from the previous year in 1998, rising from fifteen reported donations
in 1997 to thirty-three reported donations in 1998.1' Preliminary data from
1999 also demonstrates a similar rate of growth for living kidney donation by
minors.7" No data exist on the number of bone marrow donations by minors.
However, many hospitals and clinics, without judicial approval, permit a minor
to donate bone marrow under established guidelines."
Despite the increase in living organ and tissue donations by minors, there
is a dearth of jurisprudence to assist a court in adjudicating the propriety of a
donation. The lack of jurisprudence is due to the fact that many cases are not
reported and many donations are never challenged.74 All of the reported cases
69. See, e.g., Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972) and Little v. Little, 576
S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), discussed at infra Section [V.A.
70. See UNOS's website, supra note 2.
71. Id.
72. See supra note 6.
73. This information was acquired through contacting several hospitals and clinics throughout
Louisiana.
74. "Challenges" to donations occur usually because hospitals and physicians want judicial
authorization to protect them from subsequent lawsuits. See Korins, supra note 44, at 500 n.5 (stating
that very few cases are reported and many donations are not "challenged"); Jennifer S. Bard, The
Diagnosis Is Anencephaly And The Parents Ask About Organ Donation: Now What? A Guide For
Hospital Counsel And Ethics Committees, 21 W. New Eng. L Rev. 49, 72 (1999) [hereinafter Bard]
("As a practical matter, donations between family members usually take place without legal
intervention. Although sometimes hospital attorneys seek a declaratoryjudgment from the court before
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involving a living organ or tissue donation by a minor are discussed below."
Analogous cases involving a living organ or tissue donation by an incompetent
who is not a minor are also discussed.
Courts adjudicating the propriety of a living organ or tissue donation by an
incompetent have not applied a uniform standard; however, many courts tend
to focus on certain core facts. For instance, such facts as the age and mental
competency of the donor are of particular importance. Many of the
adjudicating courts have also placed emphasis on the fact that the incompetent
donor was represented by an attorney who opposed the donation. Presumably,
such representation furthers the interests of the incompetent because the
propriety of the donation is fully explored in an adversarial proceeding.
However, because the courts have been without legislative guidance in deciding
cases involving living organ or tissue donation by a minor, many of the
decisions appear to be decided somewhat arbitrarily and weakly reasoned. 6
Furthermore, as the following case analysis illustrates, the jurisprudential
standard that each court claimed it was applying and the standard it actually
applied are not always consistent. This inconsistency has not only added to the
confusion surrounding the proper application of the substituted judgment and
best interests standards, but it has also created uncertainty about what facts are
pertinent to a determination of whether a donation should be permitted.
A. Purported Application of the Substituted Judgment Standard
In Strunk v. Strunk," the Kentucky Supreme Court held that Jerry Strunk,
a twenty-seven-year-old mental incompetent with the mental capacity of a six-
the procedure takes place, these opinions are often not reported decisions. When both parents give their
consent to an intra-family donation, court intervention is rare."); Robbennolt et al., supra note 8, at 218;
Jenn Swenson Bregman, Conceiving To Abort And Donate Fetal Tissue: New Ethical Strains In The
Transplantation Field-A Survey Of Existing Law And A Proposal For Change, 36 UCLA L Rev.
1167, 1185 (1989) [hereinafter Bregman]. See also Thomas R. Trenkner, Tort Liability Of Physician
Or Hospital In Connection With Organ Or Tissue Transplant Procedures, 76 A.LR.3d 890 (1977).
75. While there are very few reported cases which address the propriety of a living organ or tissue
donation by a minor, there are several unreported cases. For example, an annotated statute from Ohio
(Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2317.54 (West 2000)) lists an unpublished opinion and states:
ln determining whether to grant an order authorizing parents to consent to their child's organ
donation surgery, a court must independently balance and evaluate the facts of the case in
light of the following criteria: (I) the prospective donor's desire to proceed with the surgery,
(2) the prospective donor's level of maturity and understanding, (3) the risks and benefits
of the transplant surgery, (4) the good faith and reasonableness of the parents' consent, and
(5) whether the minor's interests have been adequately represented. In re Guardianship of
Ingram, 11 OBR 570 (CP, Ottawa 1983).
Id.
76. Contrast In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 284 So. 2d 338
(La. 1973), a three-page opinion, ten-line legal analysis,from Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (I.
1990), a twenty-six page opinion in which the court set out three factors to consider in adjudicating
cases involving a bone marrow donation by a minor.
77. 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
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year-old, could donate a kidney to his twenty-eight-year-old brother, Tommy,
who was dying from a kidney disease. The entire family, including a number
of collateral relatives, was tested and found to be medically incompatible to
donate. Jerry's mother acting as committee,7" petitioned the court to permit the
donation. Jerry's father also supported the donation; however, a guardian ad
litem, appointed to represent Jerry's interests, opposed the donation.79
The Strunk court justified the donation by applying what it perceived to be
the substituted judgment standard: "The right to act for the incompetent in all cases
has become recognized in this country as the doctrine of substituted judgment and
is broad enough not only to cover property but also to cover all matters touching on
the well-being of the ward. ' While the Strunk court embraced the substituted
judgment standard, the court failed to discuss what Jerry would do if he was
competent and instead, focused on the county court's findings."' The county court
found that the operation was necessary and would be beneficial not only to Tommy,
but also to Jerry. The court also found that Jerry was "greatly dependent upon
Tommy, emotionally and psychologically, and that his well-being would be
jeopardized more severely by the loss of his brother than by the removal of a
kidney."' 2 Furthermore, the court noted that testimony in the county court included
the ward's psychiatrist who opined that the death of Jerry's brother would have an
extremely traumatic effect upon Jerry. The court also to notice of the Department
of Mental Health recommendation that the operation take place. Jerry's appointed
guardian ad litem, throughout the legal proceedings, continually questioned the
power of the state to authorize the removal of Jerry's kidney.'3
Improper application of the substituted judgment standard is also illustrated in
the case of Hart v. Brown." This case underscores the current ambiguity as to what
facts are relevant to a determination of whether a donation should be permitted. In
78. A "committee" is similar to a "curator" in Louisiana. See La. Civ. Code art. 389.1.
79. See Hawkins, supra note 33, at 2106 ("Legal counsel for minors usually falls into two fonml
categories: guardians ad litem and attorneys. Typically, a guardian ad litem advocates the child's best
interests while an attorney advocates the child's expressed wishes. Very few states, however, clearly
differentiate between the two.").
80. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 148.
81. See Louise Harmon, Falling Off The Vine: Legal Fictions And The Doctrine Of Substituted
Judgment, 100 Yale U. 1, 34-35 (1990), wherein the author points out that, prior to Strunk the
doctrine of substituted judgment had never been used for anything other than making allowances or
gifts from a lunatic's surplus income. The author also notes that the doctrine had been used only in
cases of insanity, in which the court could look to an incompetent's former intentional states.
Moreover, the author states that since the "mentally retarded" donor in Strunk always lacked the
capacity to make gifts, there was no prior acts from which to draw an inference of probable donative
intent, thus giving the judge "unfettered discretion" in making a substituted judgment.
82. Strunk, 445 S:W.2d at 146.
83. However, in a strong dissenting opinion, one judge stated that "[tlhe ability to fully
understand and consent is a prerequisite to the donation of a part of the human body" and that "[t]o hold
that committees, guardians or courts have such awesome power even in the persuasive case before us,
could establish legal precedent, the dire result of which we cannot fathom." Id. at 150-51 (Steinfeld,
J., dissenting).
84. 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972).
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Hart, the Connecticut court held that seven-year-old Margaret Hart could donate a
kidney to her identical twin sister, Kathleen, who was suffering from a kidney
disease. The twins' parents, Peter and Eleanor, were tested and excluded as donors
because of medical incompatibility. Thereafter, Mr. and Mrs. Hart brought the
action to declare their power to consent to the proposed operation. A guardian ad
litem was appointed for each twin; both supported the donation. Moreover, a clergy
person testified that the parents were making a morally and ethically sound decision.
Relying on Strunk v. Strunk, 5 Bonner v. Moran,"s and three unreported
Massachusetts cases,"7 the Hart court concluded it had the power to adjudicate the
issue before it and claimed to apply the substituted judgment standard. However,
the court did not explore what Margaret would do if she were competent. Instead,
the court determined that Mr. and Mrs. Hart could substitute their consent for
Margaret after a close, independent, and objective investigation of their motivation
and reasoning.
The Hart court reviewed the medical testimony which indicated that the twins
were medically compatible. Moreover, the court noted that a psychiatrist examined
Margaret and found her to have a strong identification with her twin sister. The
court also noted that the psychiatrist testified 'that if the expected successful results
are achieved they would be of immense benefit to the donor in that the donor would
85. 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
•86. 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941). In Bonner, a physician was sued for damages based on an
alleged assault and battery committed when he performed operations on a fifteen-year-old boy to
provide the boy's cousin, who had been severely burned, with flesh for a skin graft. Although the boy
consented to the procedures at the request of his aunt, the boy's mother neither knew of the nature of
the operations nor consented to them. The court found that the circumstances involved in the case were
inadequate to create an exception to the general requirement of valid consent because the operations
were not performed for the child's benefit. The court noted that, in fact, the operations involved
sacrifice on the part of the boy of two months of schooling, in addition to serious physical pain and
possible results affecting his future life, including at least some permanent marks ofdisfigurement. The
court also noted that the techniques of the operations were so involved as to require a mature mind to
understand precisely what the donor was offering to give. Therefore, the court held that
notwithstanding the boy's consent, the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury that the physician
should have obtained the consent of the boy's parents before performing the operations.
87. See Korins, supra note 44, at 509-10, which discusses these cases. Masden v. Harrison, No.
68651, Eq. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. (June 12, 1957), involved an authorized kidney transplant between
nineteen-year-old twins (the age of majority was twenty-one-years-old). The donor and his mother were
fully informed about, and consented to, the procedure; in addition, the court heard evidence from a
psychiatrist stating that the donor would suffer "a grave emotional impact" if his brother died. In
reaching its decision, the court emphasized both the nineteen-year-old donor's consent and the potential
emotional harm to him if the donee-recipient died. The other two cases involved twins who were
fourteen-years-old. In each case, the court made a finding that the donor fully understood the procedure
(i.e., a kidney transplant) and consented to it. In Huskey v. Harrison, No. 68666, Eq. Mass. Sup. Jud.
Ct. (Aug. 30, 1957), the court found the fact that both the donor and parent consented determinative
and, thus, the transplant was authorized. In Foster v. Harrison, No. 68674, Eq. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct.
(Nov. 20,1957), the court found that the donor was of"good understanding and intelligence" and "fully
informed of... the nature of the operation and its possible risks and consequences." For a complete
discussion of the early Massachusetts cases, see Charles H. Baron, et. al., Live Organ And Tissue




be better off in a family that was happy than in a family that was distressed and in
that it would be a very great loss to the donor if the donee were to die from her
illness."" However, the court considered the testimony of the psychiatrist to be of
limited value because of the age of the twins.
The Hart court found that the testimony of the parents demonstrated that they
reached their decision to consent only after many hours of agonizing consideration.
Additionally, the court thought it notable that Margaret was informed of the
operation and, insofar as she was capable of understanding, she desired to donate
her kidney. The court also stated:
To prohibit the natural parents and the guardians ad litem of the minor
children the right to give their consent under these circumstances, where
there is supervision by this court and other persons in examining their
judgment, would be most unjust, inequitable and injudicious. Therefore,
natural parents of a minor should have the right to give their consent to an
isograft kidney transplantation procedure when their motivation and
reasoning are favorably reviewed by a community representation which
includes a court of equity."
In Little v. Little,9 the Texas court, although aware of the improper application
of the substituted judgment standard by prior courts, provided little guidance for
future cases because it failed to delineate what facts are relevant in determining
whether a donation should be permitted. In Little, the court held that Anne Little,
a fourteen-year-old incompetent suffering from Down's Syndrome, could donate a
kidney to her younger brother, Stephen, who was diagnosed with end-stage renal
disease. Both of Anne's parents supported the donation after alternative donors
were excluded due to medical incompatibility. An attorney ad litem, appointed to
represent Ann's interests, opposed the donation.
The court in Little purported to apply the substituted judgment standard, but
admittedly noted:
It is clear in transplant cases that courts, whether they use the term
"substituted judgment" or not, will consider the benefits to the donor as a
basis for permitting an incompetent to donate an organ. Although in
Strunk the Kentucky Court discussed the substituted judgment doctrine in
some detail, the conclusion of the majority there was based on the benefits
that the incompetent donor would derive, rather than on the theory that the
incompetent would have consented to the transplant if he were competent.
We adopt this approach.9
The Little court found that Anne and Stephen had a close relationship and that each
had a genuine concern for the welfare of the other. The court also found that Anne
88. Hart. 289 A.2d at 389.
89. Id. at 391.
90. 576 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
91. Id. at 498.
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had an awareness of the nature of Stephen's plight and an awareness that she could
ameliorate Stephen's burden. Moreover, the court concluded that Anne had the
cognitive ability to understand the concept of absence and thus would suffer
psychologically from Stephen's death. The court also stated:
Studies of persons who have donated kidneys reveal resulting positive
benefits such as heightened self-esteem, enhanced status in the family,
renewed meaning in life, and other positive feelings including transcendental
or peak experiences flowing from their gift of life to another. The record
before us indicates that Anne is capable of experiencing such an increase in
personal welfare from donating her kidney.'
The court further stated that there was strong evidence showing that Anne would
receive substantial psychological benefits from the participation. Therefore, the
court found that the "minimal" risks, pain, and discomfort associated with the
donation were outweighed by the benefits flowing from it.
B. Purported Application of the Best Interests Standard
0
In In re Richardson,9 a Louisiana court held, with little explanation, that Roy
Allen Richardson, a seventeen-year-old "mental retardate" with a mental age of
three or four years, could not donate a kidney to his thirty-two-year-old sister,
Beverly Jean, who was suffering from a kidney disease." Medical testing revealed
that Roy Allen would be the most acceptable donor of all the family members
tested. The advising physicians estimated that a transplant using one of Roy Allen's
kidneys presented a four to five percent probability of rejection over a period of
three to five years, while the probability of rejection using one of the other family
members' kidneys was between twenty and thirty percent. The court recognized the
benefits that the procedure could provide to Beverly Jean, but stated that "neither
a kidney transplant, nor particularly a transplanted kidney from Roy, is an absolute
immediate necessity in order to preserve Beverly's life."95
In reaching its decision, the Richardson court rejected the legal analysis
applied in Strunk v. Strunk96 because it found the procedural and substantive aspects
of the majority opinion not in accord with Louisiana law. In search of legal
guidance, the court analogized organ donation to property donation and noted that
an unmarried minor in Louisiana may not make any inter vivos donation of his
92. Id. at 499 (citations omitted).
93. 284 So. 2d 185 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 284 So. 2d 338 (1973).
94. The suit was filed by Charles W. Richardson against his wife, Madeline Cecelia Richardson;
however, at all times, Mrs. Richardson consented to the proposed kidney donation. The action was filed
against Mrs. Richardson merely as a procedural vehicle for placing before the court the propriety of
removing and transplanting Roy Allen's kidney.
95. Id. at 187. This statement by the court seen to refer to the possibility that Beverly Jean
could have received a kidney from another relative or from a cadaver orbe maintained by dialysis three
times a week for six hours a day. Id. at 186-87.
96. 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
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property. Moreover, a minor's tutor is forbidden from making such a donation as
well. The court then adopted the best interests standard and stated:
Since our law affords this unqualified protection against intrustion [sic] into
a comparatively mere property right, it is inconceivable to us that it affords
less protection to a minor's right to be free in his person from bodily
intrusion to the extent of loss of an organ unless such loss be in the best
interest of the minor.'
The court concluded that the proposed kidney donation was not in the best
interests of Roy Allen. In fact, the court specifically rejected Mr. and Mrs.
Richardson's argument that the transplant was in Roy Allen's best interests because
his sister could care for him after they died. The court dismissed this argument as
"not only highly speculative but, in view of all the facts, highly unlikely."
In In re Pescinski," the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that Richard
Pescinski, a thirty-nine-year-old incompetent classified as "a schizophrenic, chronic,
catatonic type" with the mental capacity of a twelve-year-old, could not donate a
kidney to his thirty-eight-year-old sister, Elaine, suffering from a kidney disease.
All other members of the Pescinski family were purportedly ruled out as potential
donors due to age or health. Janice Pescinski Lausier, Richard's guardian and
sister, petitioned the court to permit the donation. A guardian ad litem, appointed
to represent the interests of Richard, opposed the donation."
97. In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d at 187. In re Richardson is widely misunderstood. The
confusion is probably a result of the court's concluding sentence, which states: "Our conclusion is that
neither his parents nor the courts can authorize surgical intrusion on Roy for the purpose of donating
one of his kidneys to his sister, Beverly." Id. at 187. Extracted from the court's opinion, this sentence
can reasonably be interpreted to mean that a Louisiana court is without the power to authorize living
kidney donations by minors. In fact, In reRichardson is mistakenly cited by writers for this proposition.
See, e.g., Hal Daniel Friedman, The Greatest Git, But At What Cast?-Objections To Court Compelled
Organ Donation In Aid OfA Family Member, 30J. Faro. L 605,612 (1991) [hereinafter Hal Friedman]
("In In reRichardson, a Louisiana court of chancery was forced to decide if it had the authority to order
an operation to remove a kidney of an incompetent ward and transfer it to the ward's sister .... In
affirming the lower court's opinion, the appellate court held that it had no power to order such a
procedure."). However, a close reading of the case reveals that this assertion is incorrect. Moreover,
the concurring opinion clarifies the ambiguity found in the majority opinion. See In re Richardson, 284
So. 2d at 188 (Gulotta, J., concurring) ("The majority, in my opinion, rightfully assumes that the court
is empowered to authorize the transplant of the kidney from the minor, provided certain standards are
met, i.e., the best interests of the minor."). The concurring judge also states:
I am of the opinion that before the court might exercise its awesome authority in such an
instance and before it considers the question of the best interests of the child, certain
requirements must be met. I am of the opinion that it must be clearly established that the
surgical intrusion is urgent, that there are no reasonable alternatives, and that the
contingencies are minimal.
Id. at 188.
98. Id. at 187. This statement by the court presumably pertains tothe health status of Roy Allen's
sister. The court seems to have thought that Beverly Jean was not likely to live very long even if the
donation was permitted.
99. 226 N.W.2d 180 (Wis. 1975).
100. Id at 180. In re Pescinski is a rather unique factual situation insofar as the incompetent was
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The court in In re Pescinski discussed the substituted judgment standard
approved by the court in Strunk v. Strunk,'°' but declined to adopt the standard,
stating:
An incompetent particularly should have his own interests protected.
Certainly no advantage should be taken of him In the absence of real
consent on his part, and in a situation where no benefit to him has been
established, we fail to find any authority for the county court, or this court,
to approve this operation."°2
The In re Pescinski court emphasized the lack of benefit to Richard, thereby
indicating that it was applying the best interests standard. But the court also
highlighted the lack of consent, stating: "No evidence in the record indicates that
Richard consented to the transplant. Absent that consent, there is no question that
the trial court's conclusion that it had no power to approve the operation must be
sustained."' 3  Therefore, what standard the court was using is somewhat
questionable.
In In re Doe," the New York court held, in a brief, two-page, per curiam
opinion, that John Doe, a severely mentally retarded forty-three-year-old with the
mentality of a two-year-old, could donate bone marrow to his thirty-six-year-old
brother who suffered from chronic myelogenous leukemia. The brother petitioned
the court to permit the donation. A guardian ad litem, appointed to represent John's
interests, opposed the donation.
The In re Doe court stated that the source of any power a court may have to
authorize an incompetent's participation in a surgical procedure to save the life of
another is confined to its patens patriae power and, thus, authorization may only be
given if it is in the incompetent's best interests. The court found that the bone
marrow transplant would be of minimal risk to John and was the only reasonable
medical alternative to save his brother's life. Moreover, the court noted that
represented by two guardian ad litems; one proposing and the other opposing the donation.
101. 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
102. In re Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Wis. 1975).
103. Id. at 181. However, in a dissenting opinion, one judge stated that authorization to proceed
should be granted if certain criteria are met, such as a showing that: the donee-recipient stands to suffer
death in the absence of the transplant; reasonable steps have been taken to find another source for the
organ; the incompetent is closely related by blood to the donee-recipient; the donor would most likely
donate due to normal family ties, if he were competent; the donor is in good health; the operation poses
little threat to the donor. Id. at 183 (Day, ., dissenting). Moreover, the holding from In re Pescinski
was clarified by In re Eberhardy, 307 N.W.2d 881, 893 n.13 (Wis. 1981). In In re Eberhardy, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that Wisconsin courts have constitutional and statutory jurisdiction to
decide petitions seeking court authorization for guardians to give consent to sterilization of incompetent
wards. Therein the court discussed its decision in In re Pescinski and explained that the case "should
not be read as a ruling of want ofjurisdiction" on the part of the court to authorize a kidney transplant.
The court stated that In re Pescinski instead represented the "exercise of judicial restraint under
particular circumstances," noting that in In re Pescinski those circumstances included the lack of
consent by the guardian ad litem, no showing of benefit to the ward, and an absence of legislative
guidance. Id. at 893 n. 13.
104. 481 N.Y.S.2d 932 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
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without the donation, Jerry's brother would probably die within the next five years
and the use of any other donor may significantly reduce the potential for a
successful transplant. The court then concluded by stating:
The evidence was neither loose, equivocal nor contradictory. We agree that
the benefits to the incompetent if his brother lives outweigh the
physiological and psychological risks, so long as the conditions imposed in
the order are complied with. The petitioner is the sole family member to
have become involved in placement and treatment decisions for the
incompetent in the past and will likely continue to do so. Regardless of the
standard of proof that should be required in cases of this type, the record
before us demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the procedure
is in the incompetent donor's best interests. 105
Finally, Curran v. Bosze" perhaps provides the best analysis of any case
concerning the propriety of a donation by a minor. In Curran, the Supreme Court
of Illinois held that three-year-old twins, Allison and James Curran, could not be
compelled to submit to a blood test to determine medical compatibility for a bone
marrow harvesting procedure over the objections of their primary caretaker, the
twins' mother, Nancy Curran. The donation was sought by Tamas Bosze, the twins'
father, after all other available family members had been tested and rejected as
possible donors. The donation was for Mr. Bosze's son, the twins' half-brother,
Jean Pierre, with whom the twins did not have an existing, close relationship. Jean
Pierre suffered from leukemia. The parents of the twins had never married, and
their relationship was strained by earlier litigation wherein Ms. Curran established
Mr. Bosze's paternity of the twins.
The court in Curran rejected the substituted judgment standard, stating:
Neither justice nor reality is served by ordering a 3 '/2-year-old child to
submit to a bone marrow harvesting procedure for the benefit of another by
a purported application of the doctrine of substituted judgment. Since it is
not possible to discover that which does not exist, specifically, whether the
3 '-year-old twins would consent or refuse to consent to the proposed bone
marrow harvesting procedure if they were competent, the doctrine of
substituted judgement is not relevant and may not be applied in this case. o
The court followed with a thorough exposition of the law pertaining to kidney and
bone marrow donations by incompetents, including minors, and stated that a parent
or guardian may give consent on behalf of and for a minor to donate bone marrow
to a sibling only when doing so is in the minor's best interests. The court identified
three factors which must be satisfied to ensure that it is in the best interest of the
child to donate bone marrow to a sibling: (1) the parent who consents on behalf of
the child must be informed of the risks and benefits inherent in the bone marrow
105. Id. at 933.
106. 566 N.E.2d 1319 (111. 1990).
107. Id. at 1326.
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harvesting procedure to the child; (2) there must be emotional support available to
the child from the person or persons who take care of the child; (3) there must be
an existing, close relationship between the donor and recipient."
The court found that the twins' mother was aware that the risks involved in
donating bone marrow and undergoing general anesthesia were small, but the court
noted she was also aware that such risks were life-threatening. The court stated that
it would not be in the best interests of the twins if they were required to undergo a
bone marrow harvesting procedure without the constant reassurance and support of
a familiar adult known and trusted by the children. The court then pointed out that
the twins' mother, who objected to the procedure, was the only caretaker that the
twins had ever known. Additionally, the court thought that Mr. Bosze would be
unable to substitute his support because his involvement in the children's lives was
limited to periodic visitation. The court further stated that although the twins and
their half-brother shared the same biological father, there was no evidence to
indicate they were known to each other as family. Therefore, the court concluded
that under the circumstances presented, it would neither be proper under existing
law nor would it be in the twins' best interests to participate in the bone marrow
harvesting procedure.
As the foregoing case analysis illustrates, there is a great deal of confusion
surrounding the proper application of the substituted judgment and best interests
standards. The confusion has created uncertainty about what facts are pertinent to
a determination of whether a donation should be permitted. To resolve this
confusion, the legislative standards discussed in the following section are proposed.
V. THE PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE STANDARDS FOR REGULATING LIVING ORGAN
AND TISSUE DONATIONS BY MINORS
In developing a legislative standard for regulating living organ and tissue
donations by minors, the first issue which must be addressed is whether such
donations should be permitted at all. Many countries have legislation banning
living organ and tissue donations by minors.'" However, the organ and tissue
donation legislation of these countries should not serve as model legislation for the
United States. The countries which have banned living organ and tissue donations
by minors usually have done so because of religious beliefs or a lack in
advancement of medical science."'° Generally, neither of these reasons stand as an
108. Id. at 1343.
109. See supra note 58.
110. See Morelli, supra note 58, at 921-22 (stating that certain religious beliefs prevent living and
cadaveric organ donations and that some nations lack the technology necessary for transplantation);
John Gillman, Religious Perspectives On Organ Donation, Critical Care Nursing Quarterly, Nov. 1999,
at 19. However, most religions with large followings accept organ donation. Buddhists believe organ
donation is a personal decision that should be left to an individual's conscience. Because donation is
a noble act, Buddhism honors those people who donate their bodies, including organs, to advance
medical science and save lives. Catholics view organ donation as an act of charity, self-sacrifice and
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obstacle to living organ or tissue donations by minors in the United States."'
Moreover, while there exists a fair amount of sentiment in the United States that
there ought to be a ban on living organ and tissue donations by minors,"' the
general consensus seems to support such donations under limited circumstances. "3
Therefore, because the medical risks associated with living organ and tissue
donations by minors are relatively low and the appreciable societal benefits are
great, the legislation proposed below permits living organ and tissue donations by
minors.
Assuming that living organ and tissue donations by minors should be permitted,
one question that must be addressed is how such donations should be regulated.
Who decides whether a minor may donate? Under what circumstances should
minors be permitted to donate? These questions are difficult to answer and often
invoke passionate opinions."4 Undoubtedly, the decision of whether a living minor
donates an organ or tissue should first rest with the minor and his parents. A minor
should not and probably could not be required to donate an organ or tissue when he
expressly states a desire not to donate."' Moreover, a minor should not and
love for others. Judaism teaches that saving a life takes precedence over maintaining the sanctity of the
human body; although the dead should not be "mutilated" or their burial deferred, exceptions are made
for organ donation. Finally, Protestants encourage and endorse organ donation; the Protestant faith
respects individual choice and a person's right to make decisions regarding his own body. See Jennifer
M. Krueger, Life Coming Bravely Out Of Death: Organ Donation Legislation Across European
Countries, 18 Wis. Int'l L.J. 321,336-37 (2000).
Ill. Id.
112. See supra note 8.
113. See Lainie Friedman Ross, Moral Grounding for the Participation of Children as Organ
Donors, 21 J.L Med. & Ethics 251 (1993) (stating that living children should be permitted to donate
organs to their family members alone and that the consent of a parent for donations with no or minimal
risk should be sufficient regardless of the child's opinion while risky procedures should be limited to
the child's consent); Caplan, supra note 8, at 1196 and the numerous authorities cited in note 6 therein.
See also Ala. Code § 22-8-9 (West 2000) and Wis. Stat. Ann. § 146.34 (West 2000).
114. See Altruism By Proxy: Volunteering Children For Bone Marrow Donation, 312 British
Medical Journal 240 (1996) for a provocative discussion by various professionals answering such
queries as: "Should children ever be allowed to donate bone marrow to help treat their sisters or
brothers?" and "Can their parents give informed consent to an invasive procedure that is not in. the
child's own best interests?".
115. See McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (Pa. 1978), wherein the court held that it had no
authority to compel a relative of a person suffering from a rare bone marrow disease to submit to a bone
marrow transplant, even though the prognosis for survival was dim in the absence of a transplant from
the particular defendant. The court stated:
For a society which respects the rights of one individual, to sink its teeth into the jugular
vein or neck of one of its members and suck from it sustenance for another member, is
revolting to our hard-wrought concepts ofjurisprudence. Forceable [sic] extraction of living
body tissue causes revulsion to the judicial mind. Such would raise the specter [sic] of the
swastika and the Inquisition, reminiscent of the horrors this portends.
Id. Hal Friedman, supra note 96, at 621. Friedman states:
[Tihe state may not violate an individual's bodily integrity for the purpose of pursuing the
state's interest in the preservation of life. This rule covers a situation in which either the
individual is unable to consent on his or her own behalf, as in the case of a minor or
incompetent, or in which the individual has openly refused to consent to such procedures.
[Vol. 61
COMMENTS
probably could not be required to donate an organ or tissue over the objection of the
minor's parents. "' The legislation proposed below is predicated upon the
assumption that no minor is under a duty to donate an organ or tissue. Furthermore,
difficult medical decisions, such as whether a living minor should donate an organ
or tissue, are and should be made in consultation with medical professionals.
Medical professionals can provide clarity to the clouded thinking of parents fraught
with the emotional difficulty of having to decide whether to permit their minor child
to donate. The legislation proposed below should not serve as a replacement for
consultation with a medical professional.
The presumption that parents will act in the best interests of their minor
children is not always reasonable. This is especially true when the presumption is
raised in the context of a proposed sibling-to-sibling living organ or tissue donation.
Parents face an inherent conflict of interest when they must decide whether to risk
the health of one child in order to save the life of another."7 The desperation of
parents faced with this conflict is best illustrated by reports of parents who have
conceived a child for the purpose of donating that child's bone marrow to a sibling,
a phenomena termed "parity for donation."' " And while medical consultation may
Id. Robert W. Griner, Live Organ Donations Between Siblings And The Best Interest Standard: Time
For Stricter Judicial Intervention, 10 Ga. St. U. L Rev. 589,600 (1994) [hereinafter Griner]. See also
Ross Povenmire, Do Parents Have The Legal Authority To Consent To The Surgical Amputation Of
Normal, Healthy Tissue From Their Infant Children?: The Practice Of Circumcision In The United
States, 7 Am. U.J. Gender Soc. Pol'y & L. 87, 102 (1999), stating:
Thus, there is a biological limit, determined by psychological and intellectual development
factors, to the ability of minors to grant effective consent. In other words, at a certain age,
the minor is too young to say "yes." Nevertheless, it does not necessarily follow that the
minor is too young to say "no."
116. In Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941), the court suggested that doctors must
always secure parental consent before proceeding with a nontherapeutic medical procedure on a minor.
See also Griner, supra note 115, at 610. In Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (I1. 1990), discussed
supra Section IV.B, the court implicitly held that parental consent by at least one parent is required
before the donation may proceed. Because much of the law in this area is unsettled, the above
statements are conditioned---"probably could not." Until the courts articulate the relative weight of a
parent's consent and a child's consent, it is unclear how they would resolve these issues.
117. See Korins, supra note 44, at 503, stating:
Proxy consent for a transplant, which is a nontherapeutic procedure for the donor, is more
problematic. The donor will receive no physiological benefit and may be exposed to serious
risks. In addition, parents face an inherent conflict of interest. A parent must decide
whether to risk the health of one child in order to save the life of another. Courts have
rejected their traditional reliance on parental consent because the questions raised in this
context undermine the presumption that parents will act in a child's best interest.
Griner,supra note 115, at 602-03 ("There is also an unavoidable conflict of interest for the parents who,
no matter how much one may protest to the contrary, cannot divorce the extreme need of one child from
the interests of the healthy child."); Dufault, supra note 68, at 238-39 ("A parent experiences
tremendous stress and emotional pain when her child is dying. Insofar as desperate times call for
desperate measures, the parent may be incapable of behaving rationally on behalf of either child.").
118. See Griner, supra note 15, at 604-05, which discusses the report ofa California couple who,
after a fruitless search for a compatible bone manow donor for their seventeen-year-old daughter dying
of leukemia, decided to conceive a child specifically for the purpose of donation. The father underwent
a vasectomy reversal to conceive the child. Prenatal testing indicated that the fetal tissue was a suitable
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provide some clarity to the decision-making process, the medical professional
providing the advice may be the donee-recipient's physician; thus, the advising
physician may also face a conflict of interest because he must seek to aid his patient
but also provide accurate medical advice." 9 Moreover, the prospect of performing
innovative transplantations may be luring to medical professionals and thus color
the information they provide.' The legislation proposed below is a prophylactic
measure which protects minors from discriminatory or abusive treatment by
requiring court review of all living organ and tissue donations by minors not
regulated by other legislation. " ' Judicial oversight of all living organ and tissue
donations by minors provides reassurance that the parties involved have carefully
considered the relevant factors with central focus on the welfare of the potential
donating minor. 2
2
match for their leukemic daughter, so when the infant reached the age of thirteen months, a successful
bone marrow transplant was performed. It has been claimed that this is a common event: "While no
registry keeps records of this practice, a reported phone survey indicates at least forty attempted cases
of parity for donation between 1984 and 1989. In eight of these cases, the infant subsequently served
as a donor." Id. at 605. See also Dufault, supra note 68, at 238 n. 132 (citing an article which discusses
the California parity donation case); Bard, supra note 74, at 72-73 (discussing parity donations);
Bregman, supra note 74.
119. See Caplan, supra note 8, at 1199-1200, stating:
Transplant centers and other transplant personnel may face problems in providing
'objective' information to prospective donors because those involved in seeking donors have
an inherent conflict of interest. They cannot both advocate for the best interests of patients
who need transplants and simultaneously protect the best interests of prospective donors.
Those involved in innovative forms of live donation may be so eager to proceed that their
enthusiasm may color the extent or kind of information made available to prospective
donors. This is especially so when the same physician or health care team is treating both
the prospective donor and would-be recipient.
Id. Kallich & Merz, supra note 8, 143-44, stating:
Whether to undergo a surgical procedure with its attendant risks is a highly complex
decision. The potential recipient, family members, and even physicians or other health care
providers (e.g., procurement coordinators) may exert subtle (and not so subtle) pressures on
a potential donor. One could argue, as have Fox and Swazey, that by communicating to the
potential recipient and donor that living organs (especially from biologically related donors)
have a better prognosis than a cadaveric organ, physicians are engaging in a powerful form
of pressure to donate.
120. See discussion in supra note 119.
121. Donations regulated by other legislation include post mortem organ and tissue donations and
blood donations. In Louisiana, see La. R.S. 17:2351 (2000) (Uniform Anatomical Gift Act) and La.
R.S. 40:1097 (2000) (blood donation statute).
122. Even those who criticize judicial review of family decisions recognize the possible benefits
of such review. See Korins, supra note 44, at 520-21, stating:
[i]f a judicial or administrative proceeding increases the accuracy of determining a child's
best interest, the intrusion might be justified. For example, ifa formal judicial setting helps
parents to better understand and appreciate the seriousness of their decision and more
carefully reflect on the issues, then all parties would benefit from judicial review. This
process would encourag parents and doctors to consider carefully the question of donor
benefit. In addition, if doctors were aware that their recommendations could be subjected
to judicial review, their institutional biases in favor of treatment would be offset.
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Furthermore, as the jurisprudence discussed in Section IV underscores,
legislhtion is needed to provide substantive guidance to courts adjudicating the
disposition of a living organ or tissue donation by a minor. A legislative standard
would indeed counter any inferences that the adjudicating courts may be drawing
from the jurisprudence. Because nearly all of the reported cases (i.e., appealed
cases) involve a "questionable donation," such as a living kidney donation by a
"mentally retarded" minor, the adjudicating courts may be erroneously inferring that
other donations involving distinguishable facts are always permissible. The fact
that only two of the seven reported cases (i.e., appealed cases) discussed above
involved a living donation by a mentally competent minor gives rise to a fair
assumption that such donations are usually approved-possibly "rubber stamped"
by district courts-and, thus, the cases are never appealed.'23 A legislative standard
ensures that every living organ or tissue donation by a minor, whether a
"questionable donation" or not, is reviewed on its own merits, rather than through
case law analysis. Individual evaluation of each proposed donation will become
more important as the number of per year living organ and tissue donations
continues to rise and courts are concomitantly faced with cases involving a myriad
of distinguishable facts.' 4
The legislation proposed below encompasses two legislative standards, which,
due to the associated medical risks and gravamen of abuse, vary somewhat
according to the type of donation sought. The first proposed legislative standard
regulates: living organ and nonregenerative tissue donations; living partial organ
donations even if the portion of the organ donated is regenerative (e.g. partial liver
donation); and transplantable nonregenerative tissues (e.g. lung lobe).
The second proposed legislative standard regulates living regenerative tissue
donations including bone marrow donations. However, blood donation is not within
the scope of this standard.'
123. Only Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972)and Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d
1319 (ill. 1990) involved mental competents. See supra Section IV. Some writers have, in fact,
suggested that mental status affects treatment of donors. See Griner, supra note 115, at 603 (stating that
there is evidence indicating different treatment of donors depending on mental status and pointing out
that there are no reported cases in which permission was sought to transplant tissue from a mentally
competent sibling to a mentally incompetent sibling).
124. See Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493, 500 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), noting:
We consider it proper and judicious to suggest that the problem of organ donations by
incompetents can be more effectively addressed by the legislature, whose members can
promulgate standards based on expert medical, psychiatric and psychological information,
as well as testimony and experience of social workers which is not readily available to the
judiciary. While we believe that the limited nature of our decision in this case will prevent
the exploitation of minors and mental incompetents, we acknowledge that legislators are
better qualified to conduct the necessary investigations which will yield a system of rules
to adequately protect minors and other incompetents from exploitation without denying
them such benefits as competent adults may derive from the organ-donating experience.
See also Bregman, supra note 74, at 185.
125. Because issues dealing with the family tend to be resolved on the state level, the legislation
proposed below should be implemented by state governments rather than the federal government. In
Louisiana, these statutes would be placed in the Children's Code. This article is not the first in which
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A. A Proposed Legislative Standard for Regulating Living Organ and
Nonregenerative Tissue Donations by Minors
The following legislative standard is proposed for regulating living organ and
nonregenerative tissue donations by minors:
A. No organ or nonregenerative tissue shall be removed from the body
of a minor child for transplantation unless a court declares the donation to
be in the best interests of the donating minor.
B. Upon the filing of a petition seeking the approval of an organ or
nonregenerative tissue donation by a minor, an attorney shall be appointed
to represent the interests of the donating minor. Insofar as feasible, but
without unduly burdening efficient judicial functioning, the proceedings
before the court shall be adversarial.
C. The court shall consider all relevant factors in determining whether the
donation is in the best interests of the donating minor. Those factors may
include:
(1) Urgency and immediacy of the donee-recipient's medical need for
the donation.
(2) Risks the donating minor may be exposed to because of the
donation.
(3) Benefits the donating minor may derive from the donation.
(4) The quality and length of the relationship between the donating
minor and donee.recipient, including closeness in consanguinity or
affinity.
(5) Emotional support available to the donating minor.
(6) Reasonable wishes of the donating minor.
D. This Section does not preclude donations regulated by R.S. 17:2352,
R.S. 40:1097, or any other law.
a legislative standard has been proposed for regulating living organ and tissue donations by minors.
See Morelli, supra note 58, at 949-50, wherein the following proposal for revision of Principle 4 of the
WHO Guiding Principles on Human Organ Transplantation, discussed in supra note 58, is presented:
No organ or regenerative tissue should be removed from the body of a living minor for the
purpose of transplantation. Exceptions may be made if the minor is the brother or sister of
the intended recipient. In that case, the organ or regenerative tissue may be removed only
with the consent of the person's legal representative and after authorization has been given
by the court based on its determination of the best interests of the child after hearing
testimony by the minor's physician, the intended recipient's physician (who may not be the
same physician attending to the minor donor), and the minor's psychologist/social worker..
If the child is over age seven, then the child's viewpoints must enter into the court's
decision. If the minor unequivocally refuses donation, then the minor's wishes shall be
respected. Violations of this provision shall be punishable by fine or imprisonment subject
to national law.
See also Living Organ Donor Act, IS J. Corp. L 561 (1993), Sheldon F. Kurtz & Michael J. Saks,
Forward, 18 J. Corp. L. 523 (1993), and Living Organ Donor Act, 18 J. Corp. L 583 (1993), wherein
a proposed "Uving Organ Donor Act" is discussed.
[Vol. 61
COMMENTS
1. The Best Interests Standard Modified
The proposed legislative standard clearly establishes that a living minor may
not donate an organ or nonregenerative tissue unless the donation is in the best
interests of the donating minor. This declaration is in accord with the jurisprudence
discussed above." Moreover, the notion that a minor should not be exposed to
risks without benefits is firmly embedded in the law.'
The proposed legislative standard also clarifies that judicial approval is an a
priori requirement to living organ and nonregenerative tissue donations by minors.
Neither a minor nor the minor's parents may proceed with the donation without
judicial approval. However, the proposed legislative standard goes beyond the pure
objective best interests standard because it expressly requires consideration of the
reasonable wishes of the donating minor. Thus, the proposed legislative standard
accepts the premise of the best interests standard, but modifies the range of factors
to consider and provides a procedure for determining the best interests of the
donating minor.
2. The Appointed Attorney
The proposed legislative standard provides that an attorney shall be appointed
to represent the interests of the donating minor upon the filing of a petition seeking
the approval of an organ or nonregenerative tissue donation by that minor. The
proposed legislative standard also provides that the proceedings before the court
shall be adversarial. Thus, the appointed attorney, acting as an adversary to the
petitioner(s) seeking the donation, must attempt to prevent the donation. Evidence
should be presented by both petitioner(s) and the appointed attorney to establish the
best interests of the donating minor, in particular evidence concerning the risks and
benefits of the donation. However, the requirement of adversarial proceedings
should not frustrate efficient judicial functioning. For example, the appointed
attorney should not needlessly compel testimony. These procedural steps have been
embraced by several courts and are likely to further the interests of the donating
minor because the propriety of the donation is fully explored in an adversarial
manner.
128
126. See supra Section IV.
127. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
128. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 318, 110 S. Ct. 2841,2872
(1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("An adversarial proceeding is of particular importance when one side
has a strong personal interest which needs to be counterbalanced to assure the court that the questions
will be fully explored."); Martin Guggenheim, The Right To BeRepresentediBut Not Heard: Reflections
On Legal Representation For Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 76, 147-54 (1984):
[T]here are cases where counsel is essential if the child's legitimate interests are to be
protected. This is so in cases where parents wish to do something to their child that, as a
matter of federal constitutional or state law, requires judicial approval. in these cases, unlike




The proposed legislative standard requires the court to consider all relevant
factors in determining whether the donation is in the best interests of the donating
minor. Several nonexclusive factors are listed in nonhierarchical order; each factor
must be considered if relevant. Some of these factors have been considered by
every court that has adjudicated the propriety of a living organ or tissue donation
by a minor, such as the risks and benefits of the donation.'" Other factors have
been considered by only a limited number of courts, such as the emotional support
available to the donating minor. 30 However, all of these factors are potentially
important in evaluating the donating minor's best interests and, thus, should be
considered if relevant. Moreover, the listing of factors is an attempt to control
judicial discretion. By legislatively providing a listing of factors to consider, the
judge's decision is more likely to be grounded upon relevant considerations.'
a. Urgency and Immediacy of the Donee-Recipient's Medical Need for
the Donation
This factor directs the court's attention to the donee-recipient. By focusing on
the donee-recipient, particularly the urgency and immediacy of the donee-
recipient's medical need, the court is able to evaluate the context in which the
donation is sought. The court should consider whether the donation is needed or
if alternative solutions can effectively ameliorate the donee-recipient's condition.
Moreover, the court should consider whether the donation is needed now or if
alternative solutions can be explored without medical harm to the donee-recipient.
Thus, this factor will require the presentation of oral or documentary medical
testimony by a physician, preferably the donee-recipient's physician. As medical
science advances and new, effective alternative solutions become available, this
factor will grow in importance.
position is unlikely. Examples of such cases (include]... court approval for surgery on a
healthy child to allow his organs or tissue to be transplanted into a sibling .... To ensure
the legal validity of the parents' position in such cases, the attorney for the child should
vigorously oppose the relief sought.
See also Baron et al., supra note 87, at 193 ("This article's primary recommendation is that the
prospective minor donor be supplied with a guardian ad litem who is instructed to present all evidence
or arguments adverse to the authorization of the transplant."). See also discussion in supra Section IV.
129. See discussion in supra Section IV.
130. See Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319(111. 1990),discussed insupra Section IV.B.
131. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code arts. 131-134 and La. M.S. 9:335 (2000) (child custody articles),
wherein the legislature limits judicial discretion.
132. It is entirely possible that physicians will one day be able to successfully transplant organs
of other species into human bodies as replacement parts, a procedure referred to as xenotransplantation.
If alternative solutions, such as xenotransplantation, are effective, the need for living organ and tissue
donations should decrease. See Jack M. Kress, Xenotransplantation: Ethics And Economics, 53 Food
& Drug L.J. 353 (1998) (discussing the ethical implications of xenotransplantation).
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b. Risks the Donating Minor May Be Exposed to Because of the
Donation
This factor has been considered by all courts having adjudicated the propriety
of a living organ or tissue donation by a minor. 33 Because the risks of living organ
and tissue donations are real and potentially fatal, 3 4 the court should carefully
consider the physiological risks associated with the proposed donation. Moreover,
the court should also weigh the potential psychological risks associated with the
proposed donation.' Therefore, this factor will require the presentation of oral or
documentary testimony from a physician and mental health professional, both of
which should be independent of the donee-recipient. The expert testimony should
specifically review the risks of the donation according to the particular
characteristics of the donating minor, accounting for the minor's age and health
condition, rather than broadly review the risks associated with such a donation for
the general population.
c. Benefits the Donating Minor May Derive from the Donation
This factor has also been considered by all courts having adjudicated the
propriety of a living organ or tissue donation by a minor.'" However, many of the
adjudicating courts have used a narrow definition of "benefits." This narrow
definition should be abandoned for a broader definition.
It is supported in the social science literature that a minor can derive
psychological benefits from a living organ or tissue donation.' Therefore, oral or
documentary testimony from an experienced psychiatrist, psychologist, social
worker, or other mental health professional, who has evaluated the child to
determine the child's capacity to benefit psychologically from the donation, should
be presented to the court. Moreover, the court should consider the accrual of future,
not merely immediate benefits. For example, the court should consider whether the
donee-recipient, through a prolonging of life attributable to the donation, can
provide future financial or emotional support to the donating minor.'"
133. See discussion in supra Section IV.
134. See supra Section 1, which discusses the medical implications of living organ and tissue
donations by minors.
135. Id. See also authorities cited at infra note 136.
136. See discussion in supra Section IV.
137. See Mary Ellen Smith, Facing Death: Donor And Recipient Responses To The Gift Of Life,
Holistic Nursing Practice, Oct. 1998, at 32; Robert M. House & Troy L Thompson I1, Psychiatric
Aspects Of Organ Transplantation, 260 JAMA 535 (1988); Robbennolt et al.,supra note 8, at 223 n.56
(citing authority). See also discussion supra Section IV.
138. See In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 284 So. 2d 338(1973),
discussed in supra Section IV.B, wherein the court considered the potential for future benefits but found
no such benefits. See also In re Doe, 481 N.Y.S.2d 932 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984), discussed in supra
Section IV.B, wherein the court found that the donor was likely to benefit from the donee-recipient's
continued care in the future.
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d. The Quality and Length of the Relationship between the Donating
Minor and Donee-Recipient, Including Closeness in Consanguinity or Affinity
The donating minor is more likely to obtain benefits from the living organ or
nonregenerative tissue donation if the minor has a close relationship with the donee-
recipient. If a close relationship is lacking between the two, the benefits which flow
from the donation may be too attenuated and thus outweighed by the risks. This
probability stems from reality. Since the greatest benefit derived from living organ or
tissue donation by a minor is a psychological benefit, strong emotional and
psychological ties are probably needed between the donating minor and donee-recipient
to foster an appreciable benefit However, the proposed legislative standard does not
restrict such donations merely to siblings. Many minors have the capacity to
psychologically benefit from a pure altruistic act ofgiving' 39 Therefore, while the court
should evaluate the quality and length of the relationship between the donating minor and
donee-recipient, particularly examining the closeness in consanguinity or affinity
between the two, it should be receptive to permitting more than merely sibling-to-sibling
donations.
e. Emotional Support Available to the Donating Minor
The medical procedure which a donating minor must undergo to remove an organ
or tissue may be frightening for the minor, despite the minor's willingness to donate. A
donating minor will be prodded and stuck by unfamiliar hospital or clinical staff while
undergoing the procedure which he may not fully understand. Therefore, this factor
reflects the importance of having an individual, preferably a trusted parent, who can
provide the needed emotional support to allay any possible fear or concern the donating
minor may have. This factor is particularly important for younger donating minors.' 4
f Reasonable Wishes of the Donating Minor
Since the personal autonomy of the donating minor is at stake, the minor should
have the opportunitytoexpress his wishes pertaining to the donation. This factorpermits
the court to consider these wishes, but only if they are reasonable. The minor's wishes
may be unreasonable under two circumstances. First, the minor may be too young to
make reasoned decisions. In such a case, the minor's wishes should not even be sought
by the court Second, the minor's wishes may be unreasonable, such as when a minor
seeks approval for an unreasonably dangerous donation. Under this situation, the
minor's unreasonable wishes should be disregarded by the court
139. See Robbennolt et al., supra note 8 and authorities cited in supra note 136.
140. See Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319,1343 (li. 1990) (discussing the importance of having
emotional support available for a minor bone marrow donor), discussed in supra Section IV.B.
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4. The Limited Scope
The scope of the proposed legislative standard is set out in subsection (D), which
clarifies that neither Louisiana Revised Statutes 17:2352 (the Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act), 14140:1097 (the blood donation statute),"2 nor any other lawpertaining to donations
of any sort, by minors or majors, is precluded.
B. The Proposed Legislative Standard for Regulating Living Regenerative Tissue
Donations by Minors
The following legislative standard is proposed for regulating living regenerative
tissue donations by minors:
A. No regenerative tissue shall be removed from the body ofa minor child for
transplantation unless a court declares the donation to be in the best interests
of the donating minor.
B. If the parents of a mentally competent minor child provide informed
consent to the donation of that minor's regenerative tissue, there shall be a
rebuttable presumption that the donation is in the best interests of the donating
minor, however, ifthe donation is shown by clear and convincing evidence not
to be in the best interests of the donating minor, the court shall not approve the
donation.
C. Upon the filing of a petition seeking the approval of a regenerative tissue
donation by a minor, an attorney shall be appointed to represent the interests
of the donating minor. Insofar as feasible, but without unduly burdening
efficient judicial fiinctioning, the proceedings before the court shall be
adversarial.
D. The court shall consider all relevant factors in determining whether the
donation is in the best interests of the donating minor. Those factors ray
include:
(1) Urgency and immediacy ofthe donee-recipient's medical need for the
donation.
(2) Risks the donating minor may be exposed to because of the donation.
(3) Benefits the donating minor may derive from the donation.
(4) The quality and length ofthe relationship between the donating minor
and donee-recipient, including closeness in consanguinity or affinity.
(5) Emotional support available to the donating minor.
(6) Reasonable wishes of the donating minor.
E. This Section does not preclude donations regulated by R.S. 17:2352, R.S.
40:1097, or any other law.
14 1. See La. R.S. 17:2352 (2000) (governs consent to postmortem organ donations).
142. See La. R.S..40:1097 (2000) (seventeen-year-old minor may consent to donation of blood).
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I. The Rebuttable Presumption
The proposed legislative standard for living regenerative tissue donationsbyminors
accords greater deference to parental authority than the standard for living organ and
nonregenerative tissue donations by minors. This deference to parental authority,
implemrented in the form of a rebuttable presumption, is justified because the state's
interest in protecting the health of minor children is less threatened by the low risks




However, the proposed legislative standard for living regenerative tissue
donations by minors does not accord absolute deference to parental authority. The
rebuttable presumption is conditioned upon two prerequisites. First, the rebuttable
presumption only arises in the context of a living regenerative tissue donation by a
"mentally competent" minor. The proposed legislative standard does not define the
concept of mental competency, but instead, purposefully leaves the term open for
interpretation. By providing flexibility in defining this term, the courts have greater
power to protect mentally incompetent minors from potential discriminatory
abuse.'" If the donating minor is not mentally competent, the court should proceed
to adjudicate the best interests of the minor without a presumption in favor of
parental choice.
Second, the donating minor's parents must be informed of the medical risks
associated with the living regenerative tissue donation before a rebuttable
presumption may arise. This is a prerequisite that, hopefully, all parents will fulfill
before even considering that their minor child donate regenerative tissue. The
prerequisite of informed parental consent should rarely stand as an obstacle to the
rebuttable presumption and can be easily accomplished through consultation with
a physician and completion of a release form which explains the associated risks. "5
However, parental disagreement over whether the minor should donate is more
likely to occur, especially in cases involving unmarried parents. If there is parental
disagreement, the court should proceed to adjudicate the best interests of the minor
without a presumption in favor of either parent's choice.'"
Parental authority is also tempered by a clear and convincing burden of
proof." If the proposed living regenerative tissue donation is shown by clear and
143. See supra Section 11, discussing the constitutional implications of living organ and tissue
donations by minors. See also La. R.S. 40:1097 (2000) (seventeen-year-old minor may consent to
donation of blood), wherein the state has legislatively declared that its interest in protecting the health
of minors is low with respect to blood donation.
144. See Griner, supra note 115, at 603 (discussing reports of different treatment of donors
depending on mental competency).
145. In Louisiana, see La. R.S. 40:1299.40 (2000) and Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d
398 (La. 1988).
146. See Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (111. 1990), discussed in supra Section IV.B.
147. See Chatelain v. State Dept. of Transp. and Dev., 586 So. 2d 1373, 1378 (La. 1991) C'The
burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence requires a party to persuade the trier of fact that the
fact or causation sought to be proved is highly probable, i.e. much more probable than its non-
existence."); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Edwards, 329 So. 2d 437, 442 (La. 1976) ("The standard
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convincing evidence not to be in the best interests of the mentally competent
donating minor, then the court should not approve the donation. While this burden
of proof should rarely be overcome, it provides a means by which to prevent
donations that are not in the best interests of the donating minor. 4'
CONCLUSION
As the shortage in transplantable organs and tissues increases over the next few
years, the number of per year living organ and tissue donations by minors will likely
continue its concomitant increase. The proposed legislation presented in this article
provides a framework for safely regulating these donations. While allowing living
organ and tissue donations by minors, the proposed legislation ensures that the best
interests of the donating minor are protected by requiring judicial approval of such
donations. However, recognizing the pragmatic distinctions inherent in living organ
and tissue donations, two legislative standards have been proposed which differ in
the amount of deference accorded parental authority. This proposed legislation
strikes a balance between the state's right to protect the welfare of minor children
and parental authority.
Bryan Shartle"
requires that the existence of the disputed fact be highly probable, that is, much more probable than its
non-existence."). See also Joseph Sanders, TheAnatomy Of Proof In CivilActions, 28 La. L. Rev. 297,
304 (1968).
148 For example, this burden of proof probably could be overcome in cases involving parity
donations. Because these types of donations involve donors of a very young age (usually less than a
year old), the court may find the donation not to be in the best interests of the donating minor by clear
and convincing evidence. See supra note 118 and accompanying text, discussing parity donations.
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